Al-Qaem border crossing is still closed.

A pregnant Syrian woman died on Monday September 3^rd, at the Syrian side of Al-Qaem border crossing point. A day earlier 3 young boys, suffering injuries also died. The children arrived at the border three days previously, already suffering injuries. The stranded Syrians, including the pregnant woman who needed assistance as she was about to give birth, received no assistance from the Iraqi side, while the border remains closed, reported al-Anbar NGOs Council.

In a separate incident, one child died on September 2^nd, also on the Syrian side where the refugees are still stranded. Apparently the child suffered an asthma case during a sand storm.

Al-Qaem border crossing has been closed since 16 August and there has been no increase in the number of Syrian refugees, which remains at 15,898 according to UNHCR (28 Aug 2012).

According to local NGOs, a total of 350-400 Syrian families are stranded on the Syrian side of this border. The refugees were trying to enter Iraq, fleeing the violence in the Syrian city of Der El-Zur when the Iraqi side closed the border and erected concrete barriers (4 meters high and 40 meters wide) on the morning of August 21^st, to block the entry of Syrian refugees. The move was criticized by Iraq's parliamentary human rights committee, and described as a move against human rights principles.

On September 3^rd, Al-Jazeera reported “al-Qaem border crossing is expected to be re-opened by the Iraqi authorities as soon as a new camp is established as the first one is already fully occupied.” Indeed, a new camp is currently under construction.

While the Al-Waleed and Rabiya border crossing points remain open UNHCR is advocating with the government that the Al-Qaem border be reopened. The Kurdistan Regional Government re-opened its borders to allow the entry of Syrian refugees two days after closing the borders, according to a security source in Duhok quoted by Radio Nawa. The source confirmed on September 2^nd, that the decision to close the border crossing was taken as a security measure. Tens of Syrians entered the KRG through the Fishkhabour crossing point on the Syrian-Iraqi borders as soon as it was re-opened.

Al-Qaem Camp – Needs Registered

The Al-Qaem camp hosts almost 2,000 refugees and is being expanded. Another 1,700 refugees staying in schools are expected to be relocated to the camp very soon to allow classes to resume, according to UNHCR. In Al-Qaem, an Emergency Coordination Cell has been established by the Iraqi Government to plan for the movement of all Syrians who sought refuge in Anbar (mostly hosted in schools) to the UNHCR refugee camp, 5 km from Al-Qaem. The process has already started.

One international NGO and the Love and Peace Forum (a National NGO) visited the border city on Thursday 30 August 2012. Meetings were held with the representative of the Ministry of Displacement and Migration Mr. Salam Khafaji, UNHCR and Islamic Relief staff who are managing the camp.

Both NGOs conducted a needs assessment at Al-Qaem Camp that is hosting the Syrian refugees and visited the location where the new camp is currently under construction to receive the increasing numbers of refugees.

According to the Love and Peace Forum, the needs at the current camp included:

• Children and enfant milk;
• Diapers;
• Children food supplements (soup and wheat);
• Drinking water;
• Medical treatment (chronic diseases);
• Additional sanitation facilities;
• Cookers to go along with the food baskets that will be distributed soon, replacing the hot meals distribution system.
• Winter clothes.

For their part, the Syrian refugees in Al-Qaem camp voiced frustration of their situation, saying that the inconvenient conditions they have to endure will dissuade other Syrians from seeking refuge in the Iraqi territories.

Syrian refugees have been entering Iraq at inconsistent rates. While Kurdistan has maintained a generally open policy toward refugees, most of whom have been Syrian Kurds, Baghdad has remained fickle regarding its stance toward evacuees. After opening the border for a brief stint between July and August, Baghdad closed its al-Qaem border on August 16^th, only to reopen it again on September 18^th with some improved humanitarian conditions, yet generally insufficient provisions, such as a lack of hygienic supplies, low quality and quantity food, as well as inadequate medical assistance. Various reasons were given for closing the border concerning both camp capacity and domestic security. In Kurdistan, some younger male refugees have been welcomed and provided with military training.

On August 16^th, when Baghdad decided to close al-Qaem border in al-Anbar province, two reasons were given, according to a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report. The first reason was to wait for UNHCR to improve the camp and prepare for more refugees. The project included additional shelter, medical supplies, food supplies, and a plan to expand the water quantity to 470,000 liters. After the project, the camp was to be reopened (al-Qaem city council cited this as the main reason). The other reason, however, was security. The same HRW report states that “Iraqi authorities have announced that they will re-open the border after expanding the capacity of a camp at al-Qaem, though an official at Iraq’s Ministry of Displacement and Migration told Human Rights Watch on August 27^th that the ministry had not recommended closing the border and described the decision as purely a ‘security measure.’”

Baqer Jabr al-Zubaidi, a former finance and interior minister, who is now a parliament member from Mr. Maliki's coalition was also quoted saying “[i]f al-Qaeda succeeds in toppling the regime in Syria, then the Shiite government in Iraq will be next."

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari further supported al-Zubaidi’s assertion in a separate statement: "The flow of refugees, the entrenchment of terrorist organizations, the veil of a fundamentalist regime, all this could impact us," Zebari told Reuters. "We are trying to take an independent position. Based on our national interests... Things are not black and white."

Although there is no evidence whether closing the border actually contributed to Iraq’s national security and prevented infiltrators, it certainly had not stopped shelling and other threats from across the border. On September 7^th, 3 shells were launched into Iraq from the Abu Kamal district in Syria, killing 2 civilians, one of whom was a 5-year-old girl, and injuring 5 others. And while the official rhetoric focuses on preventing a “Sunni” threat, the rockets were Russian Katyusha rockets, which were most likely used by the regime.

Eventually, al-Qaem was reopened on Tuesday, September 18^th, with increased security, which, as of September 24^th, prevents single young men from entering the camp, allowing only women, children, and elderly or sick people. Between September 19^th and the 23^rd, a total of 618 Syrian refugees were granted entrance into the Iraqi territories, averaging 123 people per-day.

Tying up humanitarian issues with national security is not new; nor is prioritizing national security over human rights. However, the way by which al-Zubaidi and Zebari generalize the identity of Syrian refugees and link their migration with al-Qaeda, while placing them in opposition to the “Shiite government in Iraq,” distances officials from a responsibility for fundamental humanitarian matters. By conjuring the al-Qaeda threat, real or imagined, and associating it with an influx of a population in need, the Iraqi government can, and has been able to, justify almost any policy on the basis of an identity.

Conversely in the north, the KRG hosts their (mostly Kurdish) refugees very differently. As of September 28^rd, the KRG hosts approximately 28,074 refugees distributed throughout Domiz camp in Dohuk, as well as host communities in Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah. There is also a new camp under construction in Kasak, Mosul. Syrian Kurdish politics and their relationship with the KRG have created new regional dynamics, while the lack of international aid has generated domestic tension.

Syrian Kurdish identity in the KRG, as it relates to armed resistance, functions on several levels. By providing arms and military training, the KRG and various Kurdish political parties are offering a solution to Syria’s uprising, which would simultaneously provide “protection” to Kurdistan and offer a new instrument for Syrian Kurdish autonomy. However, the overall goals of the new militia are ambiguous.

Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) external relations chief, Hayman Hawrami, said that they provided military training to many of the young men “so they can be a main supporter of the Syrian opposition and a main supporter of the positive change in Syria.” Furthermore, although the training has been viewed as an aggressive measure, both by Baghdad and Ankara, Kurdish officials, such as Saleh Muslim, the leader of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria, maintain that it is “for the purpose of protection” and not explicitly to fight in Syria.

There are also opportunities for conflict. Although Iraqi Kurds have already established an autonomous region and maintain a distinct heritage, part of their culture is still intrinsically tied to Iraqi Arab culture because of their converging histories, governments, customs, and even ethnicities. This is analogous to Kurds who live/lived in Syria and their relationship with Syrian Arab identity. Syrian Kurds may experience inequality for a number of reasons because they are “visitors” and have entered into a reciprocal relationship with their Iraqi Kurdish comrades. They may even face conflict if they support the PYD, a rival faction of the two ruling parties in the KRG and believed by some Syrian opposition websites to be supported by the al-Assad regime. Many Syrian Kurds are still fighting for their own autonomous region in northeast Syria and do, in fact, support the PYD. And although it is entirely possible that conflictive politics will be avoided and cooperative politics will prevail, this depends on how the factors above are publicly addressed and the ways by which conflicts are resolved.

Furthermore, international aid has also been a key concern for the KRG. The KRG has petitioned for additional and necessary aid from various sources to provide refugees with vital assistance during the upcoming months as winter approaches and more refugees enter Kurdistan. It has not yet received a sufficient sum, nor comparable to other host governments. Shakir Yasin, the Kurdish official who is in charge of Syrian refugees in the KRG, mentioned his petition to the EU. “Their reply was that the number of refugees should be at least 15,000 to qualify for financial aid. The number reported by the Kurdistan Region has exceeded 27,000 so far, and still nothing has happened.” While it is unclear if other governments are directly funding Kurdistan, the KRG has recently allocated $10 million to support Syrian refugees within its borders. The KRG has not placed any limits on refugee capacity as yet. Therefore, without significant international financial assistance, the strain and limit on the KRG’s resources will be felt by many.

The KRG maintains a volatile relationship with almost all of its neighbors, including Turkey, Iran, and Syria, as well as Baghdad. The mass influx of Syrian refugees into Iraq, combined with the KRG and Baghdad’s different reactions, creates new opportunities for opposition and conflict. Political and regional alliances, as well as demographic shifts are occurring, which will consequently inform and affect how NGOs operate in Iraq.