"IRAQ EMERGENCY SITUATION"

Trends in violence, Humanitarian needs, Preparedness

A study conducted by:

NCCI
لجنة تنسيق المنظمات غير الحكومية في العراق
NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq

And

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Executive Summary

As politicians and observers of Iraq – local and international - debate whether or not there is civil war in Iraq it is vital to focus all efforts on ensuring that the current situation does not worsen still further, and that all is done to prepare to meet current and anticipated emergency humanitarian needs. While attacks by insurgents and counter-insurgency operations continue and sectarian violence deepens and spreads, it is civilians that are paying the price. Violence is presently heavily concentrated in the Centre and less so in the South of Iraq, but the whole country needs to be prepared to respond to current and future emergency situations, whether in terms of conflict or natural disasters. A more in-depth study of the challenges, shortfalls and constraints that NGOs face in responding to emergencies in Iraq vis-à-vis possible trends of violence is urgently required.

Therefore, the **objectives** of this study are to:
- Examine the possible humanitarian impact of trends of violence in Iraq;
- Compare current emergency response capacity and that ideally needed; and
- Set out recommendations for potential pathways to reaching durable solutions.

This will enable NGOs – as well as Donors, the UN, Iraqi Authorities, and other third parties - to better understand and elucidate the measures that can be taken to anticipate the humanitarian needs resulting from emergency situations, current and foreseen, in order to enhance response. Recommendations will be used to encourage active advocacy and to bring the NGO community and the UN to a synergistic approach leading to a shared strategy, which, if implemented, could significantly improve emergency preparedness and humanitarian response in Iraq.

The **main findings** of this Final Report are the following:

- ➢ Humanitarian needs in Iraq arise from three primary causes: violence, natural disasters and disease, and weak infrastructure. However, *violence is a critical, all-pervasive characteristic in the lives of people in many parts of Iraq.*

- ➢ The combination of military operations, sectarian and political violence, as well as criminality and lawlessness, has *devastating humanitarian consequences for Iraq's civilians* in terms of death, injury, illness, displacement, denial of fundamental human rights, destruction of homes, vital facilities and infrastructure, *as well as for humanitarian actors seeking to meet their needs* – in terms of a decrease in resources and ability to respond.

- ➢ Human and material resources are already struggling to meet current humanitarian needs. *Needs will become acute and massive if the security situation worsens still further.*

- ➢ *The worst case scenario – in terms of possible violence escalation - has not yet been reached*. However, many of the criteria underlining a trend towards that scenario are already present.

- ➢ In an ideal preparedness and response situation, operationalisation involves three stages - prevention; preparation; implementation - and key actors and stakeholders each have critical roles, rights and responsibilities during each of these stages. *Currently, these roles and responsibilities are not being adequately addressed and rights are not respected.*

➢ Obstacles to preparing for and responding to emergencies in an effective and timely manner include lack of means, lack of preparedness, high level of violence, as well as other characteristics of the local context. ***These issues impact upon each other, forming a vicious circle of obstacles which, as the level of needs rise and the violence lasts for longer and longer, becomes increasingly challenging to break.***

Recognising the tension that exists between the decreasing operational humanitarian space and the massive needs in Iraq the recommendations in this report set out a pragmatic approach in the context of a wider framework and longer term vision:

Summary of Recommendations:

I. Stop the violence, recognise the state of humanitarian emergency present in some parts of Iraq and support the most vulnerable accordingly
- IA, All Belligerents (MNF-I, ISF, Militias, other Armed Groups), Local Communities, Regional Actors and wider International Community to refuse the normalisation of violence and stop hostilities
- Donors, IA, and wider International Community to recognise humanitarian emergencies where and when they occur in Iraq
- IA to improve availability and quality of natural resources as a first response to emergencies

II. Attain active and efficient coordination amongst all actors to plan, update and improve operational response for ongoing and developing emergency situations, and include local communities and Iraqi aid workers as central actors in this process
- All actors to improve coordination
- UN Agencies, Donors, IA, IOs, INGOs to recognise local communities and Iraqi aid workers as central actors in emergency response
- IA, Donors, UN Agencies, NGOs to update and improve operational responses

III. Create emergency funds that are accessible and flexible in order to prepare operational responses for emergency situations
- Donors, UN Agencies, IOs and NGOs to enhance trust between field actors and funding bodies
- Donors, UN Agencies and IA to provide adequate and appropriate funding for emergencies

IV. Recognise humanitarian organisations as appropriate, essential and neutral actors in meeting the needs of the most vulnerable and establishing humanitarian corridors accordingly
- All actors to recognise humanitarian organisations as appropriate, essential and neutral actors
- IA and All Belligerents to establish humanitarian corridors to facilitate access to vulnerable populations

IRAQ EMERGENCY SITUATION:
Trends in violence, humanitarian needs, preparedness

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1. Context

Background

In August, September and October 2003, bomb attacks in Baghdad on the United Nations and other International Organisations led to the withdrawal of all UN international staff and key national staff, in addition to a significant number of international organisations from Iraq. Evacuation took place to neighbouring countries, such as Jordan and Kuwait, and also to Iraqi Kurdistan. Staff that remained adopted an extremely low profile and were forced to adapt due to the necessary security restrictions at that time. NGOs began to reduce their activities or switch to remote management. For many organisations this was the first time historically that they were unable to operate within the field but still obliged to maintain a presence to respond to the humanitarian needs.

Since the start of the 2003 invasion, *at least* 62 aid workers have been killed, and many more injured, detained or kidnapped.[1] The continuation of violence resulting from insurgency, counter-insurgency operations, and criminality, and the mounting scale and intensity of sectarian driven attacks and intimidation, is making it increasingly difficult for NGOs to respond to the growing humanitarian needs. Those who have not been directed physically affected by violence have, in the majority of cases, been witnesses to horrific events, with devastating psychological consequences.[2] The climate of fear existing in parts of Iraq is over-powering as there has been a palpable shift in the level of anxiety around perceptions of what might happen next. Perhaps most crucially, in terms of emergency preparedness, people are fleeing because of this *very perception of fear.* Whereas those displaced as a consequence of military operations generally return home once military operations cease, population displacements as a consequence of sectarian violence and intimidation are now becoming more frequent and are of longer duration, as people remain too scared to return to their homes.

While there is a general consensus that emergency response capacity can cope with sporadic emergencies and needs, as has been the case to date, there is also consensus that it cannot cope with massive needs. If sectarian violence continues or increases, and fear becomes so endemic that it spreads to even wider parts of the country, how can humanitarian actors cope with needs on such a scale and in such an environment?

The level of violence in different areas of Iraq does currently vary a great deal. Security in Iraqi Kurdistan is better than in other parts of the country, and reconstruction efforts there, which started in the 1990s, are also much more advanced than in the Centre and South. The insurgency - and counter-insurgency operations - is concentrated in central Iraq, where the majority of all insurgent attacks

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[1] This figure is provided by NCCI which is currently compiling a database of incidents involving aid workers. A break down of this figure and other figures for those injured, detained, or kidnapped, are given in Appendix 3a.

[2] In one study of about 1,000 people in Baghdad, about 890 reported experiencing a violent incident firsthand, including all the children younger than 12 in the sample. See 'Psychiatrists: Trauma rife among Iraqis,' by Jonathan Finer and Omar Fekeiki, The Washington Post, 7 March 2006, available at http://www.duluthsuperior.com/mld/dfw/news/special_packages/iraq/14037257.htm?source=rss&channel=dfw_iraq. According to a report by The Association of Psychologists of Iraq (API) on 5 February 2006, 'children in Iraq are seriously suffering psychologically with all the insecurity, especially with the fear of kidnapping and explosions.' See 'Iraq: Children's mental health affected by insecurity, say specialists,' UN Integrated Regional Information Network, 7 February 2006, available at http://www.plusnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=51573&SelectRegion=Middle_East&SelectCountry=IRAQ.

occur.[3] Violence in the South of the country is acute but more sporadic than in the Centre, and here, as in the North (although to a lesser degree) surveys undertaken with the local population have indicated there is greater confidence in the political process and the role of the Iraqi army.[4] However, despite such regional variations, emergency preparedness is needed in *all* parts of the country, and also - as recent flooding, and confirmation of H5N1 infection in Iraq illustrates - in terms of all types of emergencies, natural or otherwise.

Continuous adaptation and review is therefore necessary in order to sustain the presence and improve the impact of humanitarian assistance to people in need. This is particularly the case in emergency situations, where the swiftness and effectiveness of response are critical factors in ensuring that the needs of the most vulnerable people are adequately addressed. Because of their humanitarian imperative, impartiality and independence, the role of NGOs in achieving this response in Iraq is vital. However, their ability to do so is also heavily dependent upon a wide range of factors – both tangible and intangible – that influence the context within which they operate.

Insecurity and lack of access are fundamental challenges to emergency response in Iraq, challenges that will only increase if violence spirals even further out of control. The lack of access afforded to humanitarian organisations trying to reach those in need, and the prevention of those in need from accessing support, have severe impacts on the ability of humanitarian organisations to respond to emergency situations in a timely and effective manner. Local NGOs in Iraq continue to operate under conditions that the majority of international actors have long since shunned, whilst the approximately 100 INGOs that have decided to remain in the country have been forced to develop alternative ways of operating to maintain their presence.

These realities have also influenced the perception of donors and their willingness to fund NGOs, especially those whose focus is upon emergency humanitarian response. Ironically, at a time when support for humanitarian preparedness in Iraq is perhaps at its most urgent, the means of support are most sorely lacking. The withdrawal of some donors, limited funds available from other sources for humanitarian assistance or the conditionality attached to such funds, has already served to decrease significantly the number of active NGOs in Iraq. Conflicting reports from various sides regarding political progress and reconstruction efforts influence the way in which funding priorities are identified, and affect the general perception of humanitarian requirements in Iraq; this perception, for some time now, has borne no relation to the acute humanitarian needs on the ground. Moreover, there appears to be little developed or up-to-date contingency planning around trends in violence and humanitarian emergency preparedness to address a possible rapid increase in humanitarian needs.

The fundamental role that neighbouring countries and regional donors can play to bring a positive change to the current situation in Iraq by strengthening regional security, easing tensions and providing humanitarian assistance and reconstruction aid, has been underlined numerous times, but with little proactive engagement. These states neither want a major crisis nor polarisation at the regional level. More

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[3] See United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations; Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 'REBUILDING IRAQ Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges,' 25 April 2006, GAO-06-697T, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06697t.pdf, p11.
[4] Oxford Research International nationwide poll of 1,700 Iraqis, commissioned by the BBC, ABC News and other international media organisations, 12 December 2005, available at http://www.oxfordresearch.com/publications.html.

imaginative means need to be found to engage regional actors in a positive way; for example, by exploring the role they could play in preventing the outbreak of full-blown civil crisis in Iraq or encouraging the formation of a group of guarantor states - those regional states that would suffer if Iraq were to slide deeper into civil crisis.

Meantime, the Iraqi Government, International Community and the UN are pouring their efforts into establishing a political process to shore up the legitimacy and acceptance of the Iraqi state. While key political milestones have been met, these continue to be resisted and contested using means that have devastating humanitarian consequences for the Iraqi population. Billions of dollars have been channelled into reconstruction projects in parts of the country. However, with little oversight and accountability, a large number of projects remain incomplete or are sub-standard, and there seems little doubt that many funds could have been better spent on improving the lives of Iraqis. Such wastage, combined with continuous escalation of violence and internal tensions in the Iraqi community, and recurrent military operations in some areas, is threatening the daily lives and safe being of Iraqi civilians and weakening already challenged infrastructure still further.

Purpose of Study

As politicians and observers of Iraq – local and international - debate whether or not there is civil war in Iraq it is vital to focus all efforts on ensuring that the current situation does not worsen still further, and that all is done to prepare to meet current and anticipated emergency humanitarian needs. A more in-depth study of the challenges, shortfalls and constraints that NGOs face in responding to emergencies in Iraq vis-à-vis possible trends of violence is urgently required.

Therefore, the purpose of this study is to:

- Examine the possible changes in trends of violence in Iraq and the predicted humanitarian emergency response scenarios resulting from them;
- Compare current emergency response capacity and the response capacity ideally needed; and
- Produce detailed recommendations for potential pathways to reaching durable solutions.

This will enable NGOs – as well as other actors such as Donors, the UN, Iraqi Authorities, and other third parties - to better understand and elucidate the measures that can be taken to anticipate the humanitarian needs resulting from each emergency scenario in order to enhance the response. Recommendations will be used to encourage active advocacy and to bring the NGO community and the UN to a synergistic approach leading to a shared strategy, which, if implemented, could significantly improve emergency preparedness and humanitarian response in Iraq.

Final Report

This Final Report presents analyses around the following issues:

- Humanitarian impact, needs and means;
- Predicted scenarios of violence escalation;
- Operationalisation of ideal response;
- Obstacles to implementing such a response; and
- Recommendations.

In examining these issues, the report explores the tension that exists between the operational humanitarian space which is severely restricted and the massive needs

that must be addressed in Iraq. In doing so it sets out a pragmatic approach in the context of a wider framework and longer term vision.

In order to enhance emergency preparedness and humanitarian response in Iraq, changes are required not only in terms of the *amount* of funds, goods and resources that need to be made available, but also in terms of how response and planning mechanisms are *thought* about: understanding and identifying priorities, allocation and character of available funds, overcoming critical constraints such as access and insecurity, making support mechanisms more flexible and efficient, gathering and sharing information in an optimum way and improving relationships between the different actors in terms of meeting core humanitarian objectives, principles and needs. Further, there also needs to be greater integration of Iraqis at all levels (central and local authority, community leader and NGO level) in emergency preparedness planning and response.

Timeline and Methodology

Planning for this study started in October 2005. The project was launched at the beginning of February 2006. Data collection – in terms of meetings held, questionnaire feedback, daily follow up and desk research - was largely completed by 15 March 2006, shortly after which a Preliminary Report was circulated to Workshop participants. The Workshop was held from 28-30 March and this Final Report was prepared in the one month period following the Workshop.

The analysis presented in this Final Report is therefore based upon six research tools / stages as follows:

- Questionnaires: A general questionnaire was developed and then adapted to specific participants' experiences and fields. In the majority of cases, the questionnaire was used to guide meetings (see below). Where it was not possible to hold face-to-face meetings, the questionnaire was sent to participants with a letter of explanation, and follow-up conversations. Some questionnaires were distributed to local authorities and NGOs in Iraq by hand. Some actors who were contacted were not forthcoming in their feedback. In particular, the level of response on the part of the Iraqi Authorities was disappointing.[5]

- Meetings: A total of 38 meetings were held with representatives of NGOs (Iraqi and International), UN Agencies, International Organisations, the MNF-I, Donors and some Iraqi Authorities. Some important actors could not be included in this research for practical reasons. For example, contact was not made and meetings were not held inside Iraq with local community leaders, respected individuals or other civil society associations. Meetings planned to be held in Kurdistan were not held because of problems in obtaining visas. The timeframe of the project also did not allow for meetings to be held with regional actors – such as Iraq's neighbours and regional donors.

- Desk Research: Whilst using all available media and resources, the NCCI website, archives and database formed the core of the desk research. In addition, people with whom we held meetings have passed documentation on to us, or in some cases suggested further areas of investigation.[6]

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[5] A copy of the General Briefing Questionnaire is given in Appendix 1a, and Matrices illustrating the level of response and feedback according to different groups of actors in Appendix 1b.
[6] A summary of areas covered is given in Appendix 2.

- <u>Daily follow up of the situation in Iraq:</u> The situation in Iraq is changing on a daily, sometimes hourly, basis. Through NCCI's local contacts and network, our analysis has been able to follow these developments closely.

- <u>Preliminary Report:</u> A Preliminary Report – upon which this Final Report is broadly based - was circulated to all participants prior to the Workshop and used as a 'springboard' for discussion.

- <u>The Workshop</u> was used to sharpen and refine analysis further. During the Workshop, a series of recommendations were developed which are intended to form the basis of a shared strategy focusing on improving emergency preparedness and humanitarian response in Iraq. These recommendations are presented in the final section of this report.

2. Humanitarian Impact

Violence is a critical, all-pervasive characteristic in the lives of people in many parts of Iraq, with devastating humanitarian consequences. While 80 percent of all violent attacks are directed towards MNF-I, 80 percent of all casualties are suffered by the Iraqi population.[7] The combination of military operations, sectarian and political violence, as well as criminality and lawlessness, has seen the average number of violent deaths per day steadily increase over the past three years, from an *estimated* 20 deaths per day in Year 1 to an *estimated* 36 deaths per day in Year 3, not to mention the trail of injury, trauma and fear that such attacks leave in their wake.[8]

Violence is particularly acute in the Centre of the country, (in the governorates of Ninewa, Tameem, Salah al-Din, Diyala, Al Anbar, Baghdad and Babil), being least acute in the North – Iraqi Kurdistan - and more sporadic in the other governorates of the South. The majority of insurgent attacks are concentrated in 6 of Iraq's central governorates (Baghdad, Al Anbar, Salah al-Din, Ninewa, Diyala and Tameem), with a high number of incidents also occurring in the southern governorate of Basra.[9] Likewise, counter-insurgency operations are also focused in the Centre of Iraq.[10] More than 160 such operations have been undertaken to date.[11]

Although the descriptions given in the Matrix below are largely concerned with the direct *consequences of violence*, 'humanitarian impact' also takes into account natural disasters and disease, as well as the deterioration of Iraq's infrastructure. The population of Iraq lives in a situation of general vulnerability, and *all* parts of the country need to be prepared for a sudden increase in such volatility. For example:

- During February 2006, heavy rainfalls flooded large areas of Iraq, resulting in temporary displacement of families (North) and the risk of entire villages being swept away (Lower South).

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[7] Brookings Institution 'Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,' 24 April 2006, available at www.brookings.edu/iraqindex.
[8] Source: Iraq Body Count Press Release 13, 9 March 2006, 'Iraq Death Toll in Third Year of Occupation is Highest Yet,' http://www.iraqbodycount.org/press/pr13.php. The Iraq Body Count is 'an ongoing human security project which maintains and updates the world's only independent and comprehensive public database of media-reported civilian deaths in Iraq that have resulted from the 2003 military intervention by the USA and its allies. The count includes civilian deaths caused by coalition military action and by military or paramilitary responses to the coalition presence (e.g. insurgent and terrorist attacks). It also includes excess civilian deaths caused by criminal action resulting from the breakdown in law and order which followed the coalition invasion.' See http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/. However, it should be noted that the count is based upon Western media sources. Aside from the likelihood that press accounts are incomplete; this source does not record deaths that are the indirect result of the armed conflict. For more details and a wider range of statistics and sources regarding violence, as well as a mapping of violence, see Appendices 3a and 3b of this Report.
[9] United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations; Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 'REBUILDING IRAQ Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges,' 25 April 2006, GAO-06-697T, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06697t.pdf, p11.
[10] Counter-insurgency operations are primarily initiated by the MNF- I (counter-terrorism and military offensives are usually undertaken by the US Army), either alone, or alongside the ISF (consisting of national guards, units from the new Iraqi Army in addition to MOI commandos and counter-terrorism units).
[11] See 'Iraq 'Pacification' Operations,' http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_ongoing_mil_ops.htm, accessed 17 April 2006. N.B. The numbers of operations posted on this site are based on official figures given by the US – there are many more operations actually occurring.

- To date, there have been two fatal human cases of H5N1 infection confirmed in Iraq and poultry outbreaks of H5 Avian Influenza have been confirmed in Sulaimaniyah and Missan provinces.[12]
- In June 2005 two million Baghdad residents were without drinking water after saboteurs targeted a major water main in the capital.[13] Iraq regularly experiences serious water shortages due to poor infrastructure, leaking pipes and wastage.[14] As of 30 November 2005 only 32 percent of Iraqis had access to potable water while a mere 19 percent had 'sewerage access'.[15]
- Current levels of electricity fall well short of peak demand - estimated to be 8,845 MW last summer and expected to be 10,000 MW next summer, and are in many areas lower than pre-2003 invasion levels. In August 2005, insurgents blew up an average of two electrical transmission towers a day.[16] Funds that were originally allocated to improving Iraq's water and electricity infrastructure are now being cut back to pay for soaring security costs.[17]
- There are already acute shortages of certain medical equipment, supplies, consumables and drugs, as well as health care facilities and disease monitoring. There is also an acute lack of qualified and specialised physicians in the country compared to the needs as doctors and other health workers are being attacked, shot at, threatened, kidnapped, and told to leave the country or die. In late 2005, the Iraqi Health Ministry estimated that 25 percent of Iraq's 18,000 physicians had left the country since the invasion in 2003.[18] Consequently, hospitals are understaffed and inexperienced medical residents are forced to undertake operations and procedures they are not qualified to perform. In addition, only four of the 180 health clinics planned by the US have been built, and none have opened.[19]
- Apart from the death and injury occurring as a result of insurgents' attacks on petroleum facilities, money that could have been used to reconstruct Iraq is being lost, while the recurrent shortages of refined products have had a huge impact on the daily life of ordinary Iraqis.
- In 2004 the WFP reported that some 2.6 million people (11 percent of the population) were extremely poor and vulnerable to food insecurity – the impact on children being particularly severe. An additional 3.6 million people were highly likely to become food insecure if they were not provided with the Public Distribution System ration, and child malnourishment rates would rise still further. According to a senior official at the Ministry of Health, in late 2005 approximately 50 percent of Iraqi children suffered from some form of malnourishment and one child in 10 from chronic disease or illness. A UN study

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[12] World Health Organization, Avian Influenza – situation in Iraq – Update number 4, 1 March 2006 available at http://www.who.int/csr/don/2006_03_01a/en/index.html.

[13] 'Water Main Attack Affects Two Million in Baghdad,' IRIN, 22 June, 2005, available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=47762&SelectRegion=Middle_East.

[14] According to a recent report, U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq following the 2003 invasion failed to maintain and improve basic sanitation and provide safe drinking water in heavily populated areas, a failure that may have encouraged anti-American sentiment and sympathy for the insurgency. See 'Securing Health – Lessons from Nation-Building Missions,' Seth G. Jones, Lee H. Hilborne, C. Ross Anthony, Lois M. Davis, Federico Girosi, Cheryl Benard, Rachel M. Swanger, Anita Datar Garten, Anga Timilsina, 19 April 2006, RAND Corporation, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG321/

[15] Prior to the war, 50 percent of Iraqis had access to potable water and 24 percent had 'sewerage access'. See SIGIR Quarterly and Semiannual Report to Congress, 30 January 2006, available at http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jan06/Default.aspx, p 33 (as reported in Medact Iraq Health Update, Spring 2006).

[16] Re-engineering Iraq, Glenn Zorpette, IEEE Spectrum, February 2006, available at http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/feb06/2831.

[17] For more details see 'Conflict Fuels Iraqi Health Crisis,' by Kingston Reif, Medact Iraq Health Update, Spring 2006, available at http://www.medact.org/article_publications.php?articleID=464.

[18] See 'U.S. Priorities Set Back Its Healthcare Goals in Iraq,' Miller, T. Christian, The *Los Angeles Times*, 30 October, (as reported in Medact Iraq Health Update, Spring 2006), available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iraqhealth30oct30,1,405058.story?coll=la-headlines-world.

[19] See 'Plans for Clinics in Iraq at Risk,' by Rick Jervis, The USA Today, 1 February 2006, (as reported in Medact Iraq Health Update, Spring 2006), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-02-01-clinics-plan_x.htm.

undertaken at the end of 2005 found that a third of the children in southern and central Iraq were malnourished (the same as in 2003).[20]

As the Matrix also illustrates, this critical combination of violence and vulnerability has consequences for humanitarian actors seeking to respond to needs, and therefore a further impact on the overall humanitarian situation in Iraq.

HUMANITARIAN IMPACT	Characteristics	Causes
Death, Injury, Illness suffered by civilians	• Indiscriminate killing and injury (loss or incapacitation of head of household, breadwinners, carers, parents) • Mental and physical trauma • Sickness	• Disproportionate/excessive use of force including aerial bombardment of residential areas • Shootings (targeting of women and children by snipers has been documented[21]) and shootouts (where civilians are caught in the crossfire) • Use of white phosphorus[22] • Bomb attacks (roadside devices, VBIEDs, mortar attacks and suicide attacks) and reprisal attacks • Kidnapping, assassination, torture, execution • Natural disasters (for example, flooding) • Spread of disease (whether as an indirect consequence of violence or otherwise – for example, Avian Influenza)
Displacement of families	• Forced eviction from homes or places of refuge • 'Voluntary' movement in anticipation of forced movement, or worse • Homogenisation (in terms of resettlement patterns)	• Military operations • Purposeful cutting off of supplies to targeted areas • General insecurity, fear, intimidation, threats • So-called "sectarian cleansing"

[20] See United Nations World Food Programme Baseline Food Security Analysis in Iraq, 29 September 2004, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2004/wfp-irq-29sep.pdf; 'Iraq – Middle East: Street children face hunger and abuse,' UN Integrated Regional Information Network, 26 December 2005, (as reported in Medact Iraq Health Update, Spring 2006), available at: http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=50850&SelectRegion=Middle_East; 'U.S. Priorities Set Back Its Healthcare Goals in Iraq,' Miller, T. Christian, The *Los Angeles Times*, 30 October, (as reported in Medact Iraq Health Update, Spring 2006), available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iraqhealth30oct30,1,405058.story?coll=la-headlines-world.
[21] See 'Humanitarian organizations denounce the violation of international conventions in Iraq,' 24 April 2004, available at http://www.solidarites.org/news/Communiques2004.htm#iraq250404 .
[22] Contact with particles causes burning of skin and flesh. The US is not a signatory of an international treaty restricting the use of white phosphorus devices. The substance is not covered by international conventions on chemical weapons, but experts say that the substance would probably fall into the category of chemical weapons if used directly against people. See Paul Rodgers of the University of Bradford's Department of Peace Studies, in 'US Admits Using White Phosphorous in Falluja', by Jamie Wilson, *Guardian*, 16 November 2005, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/fallujah/2005/1116admits.htm.

Denial of fundamental human rights	• Denial of access of local communities to basic supplies, health facilities, medical treatment and other support • Denial of access of aid workers and medical practitioners to those in need	• Lack of recognition of and respect for International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law • Withholding of food and water to besieged cities • Prevention of civilians from fleeing cities under attack • Unlawful detention and questioning • Occupation and searching of health facilities • Harassment of doctors and targeting of ambulances • Blocking of aid, targeting of humanitarian assistance and aid workers
Destruction of homes, vital facilities and infrastructure	• Populations seek shelter in public buildings and with host communities • Weak and overstretched infrastructure is under further pressure • Populations go without vital services for prolonged periods of time, or, for example, are forced to consume water that is below acceptable safety standards	• Bombing of houses, hospitals, schools, and other public buildings and facilities • Attacks against and sabotage of infrastructure, including oil pipelines, water networks and electricity power stations
Decrease in resources and ability to respond to and meet humanitarian needs	• Scarcity, in terms of human and material resources, shelter and livelihood opportunities • Decrease in the number of international actors in Iraq, and particularly international humanitarian actors • Decrease in the number of local specialists and experts, particularly in the health sector • Deterioration of trust: of the security forces; within and between local communities; between local communities and international actors; and between different international actors • Severely restricted operational humanitarian space	• General vulnerability of the local population – for example, reliance on PDS, high levels of unemployment, increasing number of households who have suffered death or injury and lost their ability to access employment / generate income • Erosion of capacity of host communities • Decrease in funding by donors • INGOs and UN Agencies moving to remote management, becoming less visible, or pulling out entirely • Many local experts leaving Iraq (so-called 'brain drain'), or going into hiding • Civil / military and humanitarian / military boundaries being blurred • Pervasive insecurity

3. Humanitarian Needs

As discussed in the previous section, humanitarian needs in Iraq arise from three primary causes: violence, natural disasters and disease, and weak infrastructure. Needs themselves range from humanitarian protection, to the provision of basic services and supplies, shelter, clothing, medical requirements, insurance, education and employment. Those who are vulnerable and require humanitarian support to address these needs can be grouped into six different categories:

- Displaced populations (those displaced as a result of military operations, sectarian intimidation and violence). Prior to the 2003 invasion, it is estimated that some 800,000 people were displaced in the North and Centre of Iraq (mainly Kurds, but also Assyrians and Turkmen), while in the South between 100,000 and 200,000 Marsh Arabs and at least 25,000 Arab Shia were displaced. As of September 2005, the total figure had risen to 1.3 million[23]; to date there are an estimated 1.5 million displaced people throughout Iraq.[24]
- Host communities (local communities who offer shelter and support to displaced populations)
- Besieged populations (populations who are prevented from leaving zones of conflict during military operations)
- Returnee populations (populations returning to former conflict zones, or other areas of former insecurity)
- Populations of other 'hotspot' cities (areas experiencing high levels of sectarian and insurgency violence, reprisal attacks, and / or criminal violence)
- General population (experiencing ongoing needs – needs that could become critical and acute if violence worsens).

The specific nature of humanitarian needs that each of these groups has will vary according to the emergency situation in question. It should be noted that there is a general lack of available statistics, as well as over assessments in some parts of the country without response / supply. However, it is possible to set out the *range* of needs that all of these groups *could* require during any given emergency – needs that will certainly arise in a massive emergency situation - and consequently the type of preparedness required. This range of humanitarian needs is summarised in the Matrix below.

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[23] Figures taken from iDMC, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/ Iraq country Page.
[24] This figure is an estimate provided by NCCI (See 'NGOs in Iraq Statement on Emergency Humanitarian Situation In Iraq 3 April 2006') available at http://www.ncciraq.org/article.php3?id_article=664. As well as considering populations displaced since September 2005, including those displaced from Tel Afar, Samarra, North of Baghdad and as a consequence of sectarian violence and threats, this estimate also takes into account data from the IOM and MoDM. Since 22 February 2006 IOM estimates that 6959 families, (41754 individuals) have been displaced. From 22 February until 12 April 2006, the MoDM estimates that 13764 families, (82584 individuals) have been displaced. See International Organization for Migration, 'Displacement Due to Recent Violence', Iraq, 19 April 2006, IOM Iraq IDP Program, for both sets of figures. Available at http://www.ncciraq.org/article.php3?id_article=616.

EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN NEEDS	Description of Needs	Actions required
Humanitarian Protection	• *Rights and Responsibilities:* Even in conflict, all people should be able to live free of violence and coercion, and they should have the things they need to survive, including humanitarian relief. In 1949 the Geneva Conventions set specific standards for protecting civilian populations. • *Access:* Insecurity, and lack of respect for IHL and HRL, has limited access severely, with critical humanitarian consequences. Such access is a critical, not only during and in the aftermath of military operations, but also generally throughout Iraq. • *Representation:* The Iraqi people need representation and advocacy, particularly in terms of the humanitarian situation, needs and challenges.	• All armed parties and authorities must ensure that the rights and responsibilities enshrined in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law are met. • All armed parties and authorities should do their utmost to facilitate access of humanitarian organisations to local communities and local communities to seek support. • Agencies and organisations able to speak out on behalf of the Iraqi people should do so.
Water and Sanitation	• *Clean water:* trucked / tankered potable water, family water kits, other water treatment equipment, drilling of wells (if possible or long-term), 'stand by' electricity generation for water treatment plants • *Proper sanitation:* toilets and washing facilities, excreta disposal, solid waste disposal, drainage, treatment chemicals	• Assessments of water sources and availability, treatment / disinfection requirements, key hygiene issues related to water supply, current or likely water and sanitation-related diseases should be undertaken, items distributed and the situation monitored accordingly.
Non Food Items	• *Shelter:* seasonally appropriate emergency materials, (high-quality sheeting, tents, etc), heating, lighting (candles, matches, lanterns), mattresses, blankets • *Clothes:* seasonally appropriate clothing • *Cleaning materials:* hygiene packs - soap, detergent, and other cleaning materials • *Cooking materials:* cooking utensils, fuel, stoves, heaters, water tanks, water thermoses, buckets, jerry cans	• Assessments of seasonal needs, available materials, local sources, and construction methods should be undertaken, contacts made, items distributed, and shelter constructed accordingly.

Health Promotion	• *Health service provision:* hospital, clinic, temporary health post, outreach system, with sufficient provision of trained staff, facilities, medicines, vaccines, and extra emergency capacity, including specialised staff[25], surgical facilities, equipment, blood, beds, fuel, lab equipment, morgue facilities, ambulances • *Public health promotion:* around disease transmission and public health risks (regular hand washing, food protection, good domestic hygiene, and safe waste disposal) • *Disease control:* around obvious problems - flies, mosquitoes, rodents, cockroaches, fleas, lice or bedbugs, overcrowding, breeding sites – stagnant water/ uncovered pit latrines/water containers • *Emergency supplies:* hygiene kits - bucket, scrubbing brush, soap, toothpaste, detergent, shampoo, candles, matches, sanitary items and a measuring jug and sachets for making oral-rehydration solution - to last a family of five for up to three months	• Assessments of mortality (where relevant) and morbidity, to assess illnesses (diarrhoeal diseases, malaria, measles, meningitis, respiratory infections [such as pneumonia], malnutrition, skin diseases, other) and the treatment required should be undertaken. Assessments should also take into account the accessibility of health service provision (re. cost, safety and distance). • The general approach should combine insider knowledge (what people already know, and how they behave) with outsider knowledge (risks of specific diseases according to the conditions people are currently living in, etc).
Access to Food	• *Short term solutions:* provision of food to prevent life-threatening risk of malnutrition (meeting minimum requirement of 2,100 kilocalories per day per person, of which 17% should be fat and 20% protein) to include dry, fresh and intermediate products (fruit, vegetables, rice, flour, sugar, cooking oil, canned food, etc), nutritional supplements / therapeutic feeding where necessary • *Long term solutions:* livestock and plant production materials, invigoration of the economy, access to markets, employment	• Assessments of nutritional situation, main foods, seasonal availability, livelihood groups, market system, current market for food, purchasing power of affected groups should be undertaken and supplies distributed accordingly. • Systems that are already in place need to be taken into account. For example, ensuring access to the PDS and PDS access to affected populations. • Even at the emergency response stage, both short term and longer term solutions should be borne in mind

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[25] The exodus of medical professionals has reached such a critical point that the Iraqi government has forbidden doctors, dentists and pharmacists from leaving the country unless they are travelling with the approval of the Ministry of Health; these restrictions were also in operation prior to the invasion in 2003.

Other	• *Mine action activities:* demining, UXO clearance, mine awareness • *Compensation:* for loss / damage of property, (in the case of Avian Influenza livestock or poultry), income, employment, death, or injury • *Education:* establishment of alternative temporary schools and supply teachers, distribution of 'student kits'	• Assessments should be made of any other needs that the vulnerable populations may have, ranging from making the current area of living physically safe, to ensuring that people have enough cash to survive and undertaking Child Protection in terms of providing education opportunities for IDPs and support for over-stretched host community schools.

The following two activity areas are also critical, but they are not (unless specifically linked to access) *emergency* humanitarian needs:
• Reconstruction: repair of damaged roads, bridges, oil production, petroleum, electricity and water plants; support to re-open and refurbish damaged schools and other education facilities.
• Livelihood opportunities[26]: providing or establishing employment opportunities and income generation projects, both in the traditional sense and also building upon certain legitimate coping strategies that have developed in Iraq's 'parallel' economy – such as part time work, working hours which are not fixed, etc.

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[26] According to official employment data – that is statistics covering those officially registered as being employed, and not including 'casual labour' – unemployment has risen sharply since the last invasion and employment is hard to find in the current climate of insecurity. Unemployment is officially estimated at 30 percent, but in some areas, particularly the South, is reported as being closer to 70 percent, according to various definitions in Iraq. For example, a study by the college of economics at Baghdad University found that in 2004 the unemployment rate in Iraq was 70 percent; see 'Iraqi unemployment reaches 70%,' 1 August 2004, available at http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/A66151CB-2105-418B-BFAA-73211A631611.htm. Estimates given by ABC news in 2005 for the national unemployment rate ranged from 18 percent to 40 percent; see 'Unemployment High, Future uncertain in Iraq,' 24 January 2005, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/IraqWhereThingsStand/story?id=437685&WNT=true. Writing in March 2006, one analyst reports that: 'You've got anywhere from 30 [percent] to 60 percent unemployment in Iraq, in terms of real unemployment'; see 'Cordesman: After Three Years of War, Results are Disastrous,' interviewee: Anthony H. Cordesman, 22 March 2006, Council on Foreign Relations, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/10208/cordesman.html. On 23 April 2006 the Minister of Public Works Nasrin Barwari warned that unemployment is the most serious crisis facing Iraqi society; see 'Minister warns against unemployment,' Azzaman, 23 April 2006, available at
http://www.azzaman.com/english/index.asp?fname=news\2006-04-23\159.htm.

4. Humanitarian Means

The humanitarian means available in emergency situations can be grouped into three areas that relate to the needs identified in the previous section: civilian protection, services and goods, and logistics – the means to mobilise services and goods. These are summarised in the Matrix below (compiled using feedback from interviews, the NCCI database and also by referring to various agencies' / organisations' needs and response assessment matrices for numerous responses to emergencies over the past two years in Iraq) along with those bodies and organisations who are the providers or *potential* providers of such means.

HUMANITARIAN MEANS		(Potential) **Providers**
Civilian Protection	• Rights and responsibilities	All Armed Groups, MoD, MoI, MoHR, ECRC Neighbouring Countries, Tribes, Local Communities, (*if* respecting IHL and HRL)
	• Access	All Armed Groups, MoD, MoI, MoDM, ECRC, Neighbouring Countries, Tribes, Local Communities, (*if* ensuring access for humanitarian relief)
	• Representation and Advocacy	ECRC, MoDM, MoH, MoED, Local Leaders and MPs, UNAMI, UN OCHA, UNICEF, INGOs, NNGOs, Other International Organisations and Governments, Donors, NCCI, Local and International Media
Services and goods	• Water and Sanitation	Water Directorate and Engineering Support, MMPW, MoWR, ICRC, IOM Partners, UNICEF, INGOS, NNGOs, Host communities, Private Sector
	• Non Food Items	MoDM, MoF, MoT, UNHCR, UNICEF, OCHA, UNOPs, IOM Partners, ICRC & Federation & IRCS & other National Societies, INGOs, NNGOs, Host Communities, PUK, KRG, Other Local Municipalities, Neighbouring Countries
	• Health Promotion	MoDM, MoH, IOM partners, WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOPS, ICRC & Federation & IRCS & other National Societies, INGOS, NNGOs, Host Communities, Neighbouring Countries
	• Access to Food	MoDM, MoF, MoT, Local Municipalities, ICRC & Federation & IRCS & other National Societies, IOM partners, WFP, INGOs, NNGOs, Host Communities, Neighbouring Countries
	• Mine Action Activities	NMAA, INGOs, NNGOs, UNICEF, UNMAS
	• Compensation/Insurance	MoF, UNOPs Private Companies
	• Education	MoED, MoLSA, MoYS, UNICEF, INGOs, NNGOs, Host Communities
	• Livelihood opportunities	MoLSA, MoA, MoO, MoF, Host Communities, NNGOs, INGOs
Logistics	• Human Resources	NNGOs, Local Communities, ICRC & Federation & IRCS & other National Societies, INGOs
	• Capacity Building	All UN Agencies, INGOs, ICRC & Federation & IRCS & other National Societies, Training Centres, NCCI
	• Coordination of supplies and information	MoDM, MoP, MoH, UNAMI / UNOPS, INGOs, NNGOs, NCCI and Various Fora
	• Cash (to distribute directly to beneficiaries in emergencies)	MoF, MoLSA, PUK, KRG, Local Municipalities, UNOPS, NGOs
	• Funding	UNAMI / UN OCHA, Individual International Governments (incl. Governmental Development Bodies), Regional Bodies, INGOs, Other Donors

5. Predicted Scenarios of Violence Escalation

The following Matrix sets out three scenarios of violence escalation in Iraq. It also identifies the 'triggers' – potentially destabilising factors - that will cause a significant worsening of the situation and a shift from one scenario to the next.

(For statistics relating to violence and a 'mapping' of violence see Appendices 3a and 3b respectively)

PREDICTED SCENARIOS	Scenario A (Gradually Improving)	Triggers from A-B	Scenario B (Protracted - Potential Tipping Point)	Triggers from B-C	Scenario C (Deteriorating Fast)
Government	**Consolidated**	*Contested*	**Resisted**	*Rejected*	**Anarchy**
Political Process / State Building	Approximately on track, increasingly seen as the best way forward and only way to serve and protect both collective and individual interests	*Lack of attention to inclusiveness, national unity, and issues such as federalism, etc; failure to establish credible institutional framework*	Seen as unsatisfactory, but default solution; preference of a weak state by all key actors in the political process; rupturing of the political timetable; state carved up into fiefdoms	*Break down of all political processes; state institutions cease being functional*	Break down; state is now inexistent, with massive repercussions due to its formerly centralised nature (national power grid, centralised redistribution of resources, etc.)
Means of Legitimisation	State progressively asserts its monopoly over the legitimate means of violence (and resorting to violence increasingly becomes de-legitimising for other actors); addressing the population's basic needs bolsters government popularity	*The state fails in exerting control over its own security apparatus, thus weakening the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate means of violence; public services fail to deliver*	Violence, including revenge killings, sectarian attacks and torture, is a key political resource for all actors, but remains partly covert and constrained by claims of respectability and restraint	*Violence becomes the only method of establishing authority as fighting the enemy at all costs supersedes any other form of legitimisation*	Local 'strongmen' relying entirely on violent means; violence determines all strategies, the violence ascribed to others justifying extreme forms of violence in return, both against the 'enemy' and against a faction's own power base

National Police and Army	The Police and Army continue to be trained and increasingly deployed, with receding sectarian divisions and control	*Central authority loses ability or will to control Police and Army as training proceeds according an expedient framework*	The Police and Army are largely operating according to sectarian motives and militia loyalties, under the guise of a national mission; lawlessness is prevalent	*Exacerbated sectarian tensions and the absence of a national cause drive units to take sides*	The Police and Army have dissolved into and combined with politically and sectarian-based militia groups; there is no longer any central authority or control of these forces
Violence	**Localised**	*Spreading*	**Escalating**	*Spiralling*	**Massive and Structured**
Geography (Centre, South, North)	Receding 'hotspots' largely associated with insurgency and counter-insurgency operations in Centre of Iraq; situation in South is less volatile; situation in North is stable	*Attacks and reprisal attacks and intimidation increasing in Centre and South, and all doing so along sectarian lines*	'Hotspots' still focused around insurgency in Centre, but now potentially arising anywhere there are religiously mixed / balanced areas in Centre *and* South of Iraq; situation in North remains stable, but is increasingly vulnerable. Major 'hotspot' cities might include Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk.	*Intimidation, sectarian attacks and reprisal attacks rife, especially in religiously mixed areas; key targets (religious buildings, personalities, large crowds) are hit*	Frontlines appear due to the total polarisation of communities in Centre and South; clear division of territories throughout Iraq along sectarian and ethnic lines and the establishment of firing lines (civil crisis); situation in North is relatively stable, but more vulnerable to being drawn into conflict
Insurgency	Insurgents seeking to cause political fragmentation lose ground and the number of attacks decreases	*MNF- I and ISF are unable to bring insurgents under control; militants continuously re-group and re-emerge; the political process does not lead to tangible benefits felt by the insurgent's social base*	Insurgency gains momentum, and despite pressure and losses, keeps up its attacks, and continues to evolve	*The insurgency's unity and support base is bolstered by certain sections of the population, leading it increasingly to resort to sectarian violence; MNF-I are forced to withdraw*	Violence revolves around local leaders and factions in Centre and South; militias wreak havoc as they go about defending and marking 'their' territories; the insurgency as such dissolves with the emergence of larger factions, in which former insurgent groups may play a leading role

Sectarian	Sectarian fragmentation and violence stabilises and decreases as efforts are more focused on establishing national unity; security forces driven by a sectarian agenda are reined in	*Sectarian leaders feel increasingly marginalised by political process; populist resort to sectarianism increases*	Sectarian militias build up their power bases – separate from key traditional religious figures - in preparation for an increase in the perpetration of violence	*Critical increase in scale and intensity of targeting of key religious sites and intimidation in areas with mixed populations*	Sectarian militias consolidate as general population of Centre and South turn to these groups for their own protection; extreme violence between competing factions sharing the same sectarian background also remains a distinct possibility
Crime	Levels remain high, but IP build their capacity and are increasingly able to combat violent crime	*IP become involved in criminal activities themselves and their integrity and efficiency decreases*	Levels are increasing as sectarian militia activities associated with the IP and sections of government prevent the establishment of an IP force whose foremost goal is to protect the Iraqi population	*IP become totally ineffective and even counter-productive*	Organised crime, as well as petty criminal activity, proliferates; local neighbourhoods in Centre and South (based along sectarian lines) take policing into their own hands
Humanitarian Impact	**Sporadic**	*Widening*	**Extensive**	*Deepening*	**Massive**
Death, injury, illness	Civilian casualties stabilise and gradually decrease, but process of institutionalising IHL and HRL is lengthy	*Increase in violence and indiscriminate attacks; lack of recognition of and respect for IHL and HRL*	Indiscriminate attacks are causing an increasing number of civilian casualties; the risk of disease is also high	*Further increase in violence; withdrawal of international and state actors; general absence of reference to IHL and HRL frameworks*	Very high levels of death and injury as a consequence of endemic violence in Centre and South; acute risk of disease as people are forced to live in cramped, ill-equipped conditions, use contaminated water supplies, and vaccination programmes are interrupted

Displacement	IDPs temporarily located near to hotspot areas until they can return to homes	*Increase in sectarian violence and fear of such violence*	Population movements are increasing; IDPs are more widely dispersed and for longer periods of time (less inclined to return home)	*Forced evictions, overwhelming fear*	IDP pockets now exist across the country; host communities are over-stretched; increasing numbers of displaced people are trying to cross international borders
Access of local population to basic services, food and medical supplies	Improves in former hotspot areas, but general improvement is relatively slow, because of the reconstruction efforts required	*Increase in military operations and general insecurity*	Limited; PDS and all basic services severely affected in hotspot areas; violence remains a key challenge to general improvement of basic services	*Increased targeting of infrastructure by militias for control of resources and establishment of territories*	Extremely limited in Centre and South as facilities are either destroyed or occupied; access is controlled by local factions; movement is also restricted by local militias; PDS no longer functions in Centre and South
Access and capacity of humanitarian actors	Limited according to scale of military operations, level of general insecurity and funding	*Increasing insecurity; withdrawal of many international humanitarian actors; decrease in funding, human and material resources*	Severely limited and increasingly remote in Centre and South	*Further withdrawal of humanitarian actors; only interlocutors for access in Centre and South are militias and controllers of local territories*	Totally dictated by local factions and militias in Centre and South; access in North still possible
Other international involvement	Increasing involvement focused on aid and bilateral cooperation programs	*Decreasing confidence in the prospect of a state emerging and becoming the main interlocutor with which international and regional actors will have to deal*	Dwindling international support for stabilisation, reconstruction, and aid; concern for Iraq's stability leading all international and regional actors to a measure of restraint in terms of political meddling and subversive action	*Polarisation in Iraq makes any balanced policy generally unsustainable*	Massive interference by regional and international actors promoting their interests through co-opted and sponsored factions

6. Operationalisation

This Matrix sets out three stages of emergency planning (prevention, preparation and implementation), relevant actors and stakeholders within each stage and their respective operational roles, rights and / or responsibilities. The actors and stakeholders included are:

- Iraqi Authorities
- Iraqi Security Forces and Iraqi Police
- MNF-I
- UN Agencies
- International Organisations
- INGOs and NNGOs
- Donors
- Regional Actors (including neighbouring states and groups of regional states)
- International and Local Media
- Local and Host Communities
- Private Sector

The matrix does not specifically refer to militias, insurgents, criminals or other perpetrators of violence as operational *actors*. However, it does acknowledge that they have a critical role to play in establishing access and bringing an end to violence, and as such assumes that they will form part of the *response* that those operational actors who are identified will take, whether in terms of disarmament, law enforcement, or negotiating access, political inclusion, an end to violence, etc.

Depending upon the nature of the emergency in question, not all actors and stakeholders identified may be available during all stages. For example, in the case of a deepening and spreading of violence (Scenario C), during the implementation stage there may be no Iraqi Government in place to deal with, the ISF and IP may no longer exist and MNF-I may withdraw – whether because of the heightened insecurity or changes in US policy. In addition, international humanitarian actors will be working increasingly through remote mechanisms. In such a situation – and even before such a situation arises - it will be crucial to focus even more on supporting local humanitarian actors and their capacity through whatever means remain available.

OPERATIONAL STAGE	Actors	Actions
Prevention (of conflict and humanitarian emergency from worsening)	All	- Denouncing and advocating for an end to violence - Engaging in conflict resolution initiatives - Building Capacity - Being much more critical about the way in which money is being spent in Iraq, and how that money could be spent to improve the everyday lives of the Iraqi people - Highlighting the humanitarian needs and situation of the people of Iraq
	IA, Coalition Countries, UN, Donors	- Engaging positively with regional states that could play a role in preventing the outbreak of full-blown civil crisis – such as Iran and Syria - Encouraging the formation of a group of guarantor states: regional states that would suffer if Iraq were to slide deeper into crisis

	IA, UN, MNF-I	• Further implementing projects that seek to strengthen the capacity of the ISF and IP, according to IHL and HRL • Taking measures to ensure that all actors are also operating within the law and according to IHL and HRL • Taking measures to disarm civilians, militias, and other unofficial armed groups • Maintaining and improving infrastructure and basic services, electricity, water, and medical supplies • Focusing all efforts to achieve an inclusive political process • Developing national 'response' legislation according to the standards of HRL
	Regional Actors	• Focusing on stabilising the situation in Iraq through diplomatic efforts and initiatives
Preparation (for ongoing emergency needs and potential massive increase in needs)	All	• Recognising the existence of humanitarian emergency situations in some parts of Iraq • Sharing information as widely and effectively as possible
	MNF-I, ISF, IA	• Understanding that there are vital civil / military and humanitarian / military boundaries, and learning to respect these • In conjunction with humanitarian actors, developing clear MoUs as regards access to vulnerable people and movement in emergency situations, and providing humanitarian corridors for aid workers to reach the vulnerable, and for the vulnerable to flee
	All Armed Groups, IA, Local Communities, Media	• Increasing understanding of and respect for IHL and HRL
	IA, ECRC and UN	• Finalising humanitarian response strategies, according to HRL and IHL • Ensuring that the necessary material and human resources are in place for a rapid increase in emergency needs, especially for providing IDPs with necessary shelter and supplies • Identifying the key actors to coordinate and communicate with during humanitarian emergencies, be they governmental, non-governmental or international • Ensuring the necessary coordination mechanisms to enable the authorisation and movement of emergency supplies as quickly as possible are in place

	IA	• Decentralising by strengthening response capacity of local municipalities and access to central authorities
		• Supporting NGOs, and, whilst calling for transparency and accountability, providing them the necessary freedom, space and security to prepare for and respond to humanitarian needs
		• Calling on all parties to facilitate access for humanitarian actors and for their protection in accordance with IHL
	UN, INGOs, IOs, NNGOs, Donors	• Gathering as much information as possible about local material and human resources, facilities, routes, etc, across the country to build up a detailed picture of local means and their availability
		• Educating local communities, or leaders of local communities about basic emergency response actions, and also gaining knowledge from these sources to improve response
		• Continuing to develop assessment tools and criteria for monitoring and evaluation in emergency situations
		• Advocating for an increase in operational humanitarian space, respect for IHL and HRL and emergency preparedness in terms of material supplies and funding

	UN	• Continuously revising the contingency plan (CP), whilst balancing the needs and the security context, and making the CP operational with contact information, identified responsibilities, practical information and steps for ensuring access, coordinating, and identifying supplies in advance
		• Differentiating the UN more clearly from MNF- I in the minds of the local population in order to regain trust in the humanitarian mandate of UN Agencies
		• Encouraging UN implementing partners and NGOs to assume a greater role in humanitarian assistance when the security situation restricts the mobility of UN personnel in the field
		• Establishing stronger working relationships with INGOs and making an increased effort to take into account their input and concerns, so that they can become stronger implementing partners, and also part of planning processes
		• Developing a response network that builds upon local knowledge and means, refining selection criteria of partners, and forming a network of credible NGO partners
		• Ensuring that there is adequate training, follow-up and ongoing evaluation when choosing NNGOs to implement projects
		• Working at national and local level to *clarify* policy – for example, in terms of defining vulnerable groups, and their rights
		• Strongly urging the IA to take all other necessary actions to improve humanitarian response
		• Pushing for all actors to respect IHL and HRL
		• Playing a significant role in negotiating for humanitarian corridors and better response coordination
	NNGOs	• Acquiring the capacity and skills to be accountable, transparent, impartial and neutral in order to operate more widely and independently by participating in training courses, workshops and seminars and using the resources and capacity-building initiatives to ensure the quality of aid
		• Using these skills to build and maintain good relationships with local communities and donors
		• Using NCCI, and any other relevant platforms, as vital coordination mechanisms
		• Sharing as much useful information as possible about local resources available as well as local needs

	INGOs, IOs	• Helping donors identify strong and reliable NNGOs by developing a means of sharing information about trusted NGOs and recommending tested partners • Introducing NNGO implementing partners to the NCCI platform, and any other relevant platforms, in order to strengthen the network and maintain a common stance in advocacy • Using the existing professional structure for NGOs to coordinate their advocacy strategy • Articulating emergency response plans formally and sharing these *prior* to an actual emergency with all of the relevant parties; strengthening the Contingency Plan • Defining clearly to the IA, MNF-I, NNGOs and the local community and Iraqi media, the nature and principles of NGOs • Developing response networking that builds upon local knowledge and means, including training and supporting NNGOs as implementing partners in order to assist them in assuming their role as independent, impartial and neutral organisations, preserving their operational humanitarian space and increasing their capacity to advocate • Analysing lessons learnt from remote management strategies
	Donors	• Recognising and responding to the critical emergency needs that exist in Iraq and the potential for these needs – and therefore the need for funding – to increase rapidly and greatly • Ensuring that neutral funding exists and can be distributed in a timely manner for emergency needs • Establishing a more direct relationship with NGOs, and not just channeling funding through the Trust Fund • Continuing to build NNGO capacity, but also being more supportive in funding INGOs, who are key interlocutors in this process • Coordinative more effectively and efficiently
	Regional Actors	• Establishing and positioning means to meet the needs of any people crossing international borders
Implementation (during ongoing emergency situations and an increase in the scale and intensity of emergency situations)	All	• Providing support for local and host communities • Facilitating access– for humanitarian actors to those in need and for those in need to reach assistance and support • Highlighting the ongoing and increasing humanitarian needs and situation of the people of Iraq
	IA, UN	• Doing everything to support local humanitarian actors to ensure adequate resources, supplies and coordination

	MNF-I, ISF, IP	• Protecting civilians, including aid workers, by respecting HRL and IHL in all operations • Respecting vital civil / military and humanitarian / military boundaries
	NNGOs, INGOs, IOs	• Maintaining the ethics and principles of being NGOs • Sharing as much information as possible about the humanitarian situation and needs in Iraq with INGOs and other relevant organisations • Sharing knowledge about key local interlocutors, facilitation processes and strategies around access at all levels for efficiency, accountability and security purposes • Acting as advocates and being more vocal about events occurring in Iraq • Continuing to use the NCCI as a vital coordination platform • Taking all steps to ensure the protection of their national staff
	Donors	• Being responsive to ongoing and possible increasing needs and providing the necessary funds swiftly and accordingly by developing better monitoring responses with NGOs and UN Agencies
	Regional Actors	• Diplomatic efforts and initiatives focusing on stabilising the situation, meeting the needs of any people crossing international borders, enabling aid to move freely into Iraq and the wider region as necessary

7. Obstacles

A combination of four sets of issues could prevent the operationalisation of contingency planning for Iraq from occurring in an effective and timely manner: lack of means, lack of preparedness, high level of violence, and other characteristics of the local context, such as unpredictability, the political process and corruption. These issues impact upon each other, forming a vicious circle of obstacles which, as the level of needs rise and the violence lasts for longer and longer, becomes increasingly challenging to break. This 'circle' of obstacles, its causes and consequences, are summarised in the Matrix below.

It should be noted that these obstacles and the Matrix in general, refer mainly to the situation in the Centre and South of Iraq and not in Iraqi Kurdistan. This is because levels of violence are far lower in the North, reconstruction is much further advanced, operational humanitarian space above the Green Line is at least partially respected and remote management is not generally necessary.

OBSTACLE		Reasons / Causes	Consequences
Lack of Means	***Funding*** Neutral funding agencies have either withdrawn or scaled down their distribution of funds to humanitarian organisations in Iraq. The emergency funds that are available are often not neutral, not flexible, severely limited, or take too long to be disbursed.	• Lack of stability and security • Lack of trust (within country and between different actors) • Remote management • Lack of recognised monitoring process (by concerned actors) • Lack of knowledge about which NNGOs are reliable and undertaking valuable humanitarian work • Perception that reconstruction is 'going well' and that Iraq is a 'wealthy' country with few humanitarian emergency needs • Apathy of international actors and donor fatigue	• Remaining donors have increasing power to define humanitarian strategy • INGOs who did stay in Iraq despite the insecurity are now being forced to close operations or scale down • INGOs that do remain are witnessing deterioration in their relationship with Donors • INGOs have less resources to support NNGOs • International support is struggling to meet current needs and will not be able to meet massive needs • The needs of the population are not met

	Human Resources There is a high turnover of staff and lack of capacity to fill local management positions; the so-called 'brain drain' is also increasingly dramatically, as people with the financial means seek to leave Iraq.	• General insecurity • Intimidation • Violence and crime directed specifically at educated individuals: for example, kidnapping, torture, murder	• Few international humanitarian actors remain in Iraq and those that do spend most of their time inside • Local Iraqi experts and educated people have largely either left the country or are in hiding • Increasing demand for, but lack of local Iraqi humanitarian staff • The education system and local experts can no longer provide support to the vulnerable as required • Human resources are struggling to meet current needs and will not be able to meet massive needs
	Material Resources Iraq's infrastructure is weak and needs improvement and maintenance.	• Decades of wars • Years of sanctions • Current insurgency • General insecurity • Slow pace of reconstruction	• Natural resources that are present cannot be reliably or efficiently accessed • Lack of stock of local market for increase in needs • Infrastructure is poorly equipped to cope with emergency situations • Material resources are struggling to meet current needs and will not be able to meet massive needs
Lack of Preparedness	*Coordination* Of local and international actors.	• Mechanisms need to be improved at some levels (local, Donors, IA) and linkages between coordination mechanisms are weak • Lack of coordination among actors who do not share a humanitarian agenda: MNF-I, IA	• Absence of effective means of sharing information at some levels • Lack of common strategy between different actors • General response capacity is weakened

	Planning For current and future needs	• Lack of up to date contingency planning • Absence of operationalisation of contingency plan • Absence of planning to prevent natural disasters or to mitigate their impact	• Absence of agreement or plotting of current and expected humanitarian scenarios and needs • Lack of preparation for how to implement operations to meet future needs
	Assessments Of emergency needs	• Lack of tailored assessment tools • In some cases, over assessment without adequate response	• In some areas, lack of impartial assessments (often linked to lack of access) • Risk that assessments undertaken are not the most suited to context and needs • Danger of beneficiary and host community fatigue and disillusionment in humanitarian response
High Level of Violence	**Insecurity and Access** Insecurity is the overriding obstacle that prevents the humanitarian means that are available from being deployed to their maximum potential and in a timely and effective manner.	• All belligerent activity, including indiscriminate attacks against civilians and lack of recognition of and respect for IHL and HRL • Insurgency, daily violence and undeclared civil war • Fear and threats • Absence of the rule of law • Absence of trust • Absence of knowledge about humanitarian actors	• Absence of ability to recognise and protect humanitarian actors • Areas most severely affected are largely inaccessible to humanitarian actors, or there are long delays in providing humanitarian assistance • The full range of humanitarian activities required cannot be implemented • Assessment and monitoring becomes virtually impossible • Capacity of host communities is eroding • Needs are not met

	Operational Humanitarian Space Operational humanitarian Space is severely restricted. The small Humanitarian Space left is used mainly by INGOs and NNGOs. Some NNGOs are very efficient and have the "access", which is lacking so much as regards the international humanitarian community.	• Lack of recognition of and respect for IHL and HRL • Humanitarian assistance key part of the Coalition's political agenda • Military blurring the boundaries between humanitarian / military and civilian / military • NGO Legislation which is extremely restrictive in the liberty it affords NGOs, especially National NGOs • Absence of knowledge and suspicion of humanitarian actors	• Increase in insecurity of humanitarian organisations and their employees • Increase in insecurity of local populations as they may be seen to be aligning themselves with certain military actors • NGOs and UN Agencies obliged to operate with extreme caution and discretion, struggling to continue operations while trying to maintain independence • Lack of visibility and definition of NGOs and aid agencies • Diminished acceptance and legitimacy of humanitarian actors in the eyes of the local population • Difficulty / impossibility to communicate and advocate in proper manner • NGOs unable to operate in the most effective manner to meet humanitarian needs

	Remote management Insecurity and lack of access has had a massive impact upon how NGOs - and UN Agencies - organise themselves.	• The vast majority of INGOs – and UN Agencies – are severely limited in how many international staff they can place inside Iraq (with the exception of Iraqi Kurdistan) and are forced to run operations through remote management and support – international staff working from another country supporting national staff inside Iraq • In even more cases, INGOs unable to maintain any presence in Iraq will disburse funds to NNGOs and/or contractors to implement projects	• Transfer of risk to partners • Decrease in solidarity • Perceptions are impossible to manage • Frustration and lack of trust between expatriates and local staff, international and national interlocutors • Lack of knowledge on the part of international organisations about which NNGOs they can depend upon • Lack of transparency, accountability, visibility, monitoring, evaluation and documentation • Capacity building is often essential • 'Remote' international humanitarian actors are often lacking the required depth of knowledge of the country and too 'junior' to undertake the required humanitarian assistance activities • National staff and NNGOs become key humanitarian actors
Local Context	**Unpredictability** The situation in Iraq is changing on a daily – even hourly – basis.	• Attacks and reprisal attacks • The political process • Wider regional and international developments (including policies of neighbouring states, US elections, etc)	• Sensitive and up to date contingency planning is vitally important and is still lacking • Critical need for flexibility in the implementation of such plans, including accessibility, flexibility and neutrality of funding

	Political Process The Iraqi Government is still in the process of being formed, and is also contested and resisted.	• Coalition strategy • Insurgency • Regional and international endurance and incompatible agendas • Sectarian / factional divides within the government	• The Ministries responsible for responding to humanitarian emergencies are still in the process of formation and capacity building • There is a rapid turnover of staff in the government – in some cases officials involved in the process are being targeted and assassinated • National emergency response strategies are not fully in place • Consistency is hard to achieve • Progress is impeded and slowed • Chaos and lawlessness severely affects the everyday lives of people in Iraq and the environment in which humanitarian response is conducted • Capacity of IA is either very weak or limited
	Corruption Billions of dollars has been lost due to corruption in Iraq – a large proportion of which belonged to the Iraqi people and was destined for reconstruction projects.	• Inadequate oversight • Contracts to foreign companies awarded without necessary financial safeguards; • Companies appear to have charged for work they never did, or to have paid subcontractors to do it for them for a fraction of what they were paid • The actions of foreigners in the reconstruction process are exempt from prosecution (by CPA orders)	• Reconstruction projects are crippled by poor planning, corrupt contractors • Critical needs remain unfulfilled and many projects are far behind schedule, and of a sub-standard quality • Rehabilitation of essential basic services, and ultimately the ability and capacity of the state to respond to humanitarian emergencies, is weakened and delayed • Overall legitimacy of international actors – including humanitarian workers - is negatively effected

8. Recommendations

This is a critical period in Iraq: the government is still being formed, the humanitarian situation is deteriorating, donor fatigue can be detected, and the scarce neutral emergency funds that are in theory available are not immediately accessible. Given these critical realities – realities that may worsen in the near future - asking what to needs to be done, prior to, when and if massive emergency needs arise, is a very valid and urgent task.

While many of the key humanitarian actors involved in emergency response in Iraq harbour the same concerns as NGOs, particularly around the need for better access, engagement and support, there has been little *concerted* effort and thinking to date about how to address such concerns. There is a need for all actors with the leverage to improve the humanitarian situation in Iraq to come together, to reaffirm, re-establish or establish their humanitarian commitments to the people of Iraq, and to think and act more creatively about how to improve emergency response and preparedness.

In asking for and bringing about change, it is important to bear in mind that humanitarian actors are entering an already established environment, not creating a completely new one. Working in this environment requires an understanding of how and where change is needed and possible, how existing mechanisms and actors can alter and refine the ways they think and act, and how the capacity that does already exist can be improved and made more efficient. It also requires thinking and acting *before* the next massive emergency happens.

While keeping a bigger vision and framework in mind, the recommendations described here identify four key areas of concern:

- Recognition of the state of humanitarian emergency present in some parts of Iraq and supporting the most vulnerable accordingly
- Attainment of active and efficient coordination amongst all actors to plan, update and improve operational response for ongoing and developing emergency situations, and inclusion of local communities and Iraqi aid workers as central actors in this process
- Creation of emergency funds that are accessible and flexible in order to prepare operational responses for emergency situations
- Recognition of humanitarian organisations as appropriate, essential and neutral actors in meeting the needs of the most vulnerable and establishing humanitarian corridors accordingly

These concerns are those of NNGOs, INGOs, IOs, and UN Agencies and the recommendations around them set out a series of practical objectives and measurable steps to address various needs, obstacles and challenges. The fundamental aspect they each have in common is that, if achieved, they will make a positive difference to the lives of the Iraqi people.

I. Recognise the state of humanitarian emergency present in some parts of Iraq and support the most vulnerable accordingly		
Recommendations	**Objectives**	**Operational steps**
Donors, IA, and wider International Community to **recognise humanitarian emergencies where and when they occur in Iraq**	• Establish a mechanism for a common advocacy strategy within the humanitarian community for better recognition of humanitarian needs	→ NGOs to encourage Donors and the IA to launch a campaign to build up statistics and databases to establish and track humanitarian indicators in Iraq → NGOs to use various networks such as NCCI, other international platforms, the Media, the UN and the IA to address actors that cannot be reached currently
IA, All Belligerents (MNF-I, ISF, Militias, other Armed Groups), Local Communities, Regional Actors and wider International Community to **refuse the normalisation of violence and stop hostilities**	• Reject violence against civilians so that it does not become an accepted aspect of life in Iraq • Encourage conflict resolution and national reconciliation • Prevent deepening of conflict and protect civilians	→ All to establish strong local, regional and international lobbying mechanisms to denounce violence and call for an end to conflict → UN to provide a coordination mechanism for advocacy to the IA and ministries to denounce violence → UN to reaffirm sanctions banning the importation of arms and weapons into Iraq for other purpose that rearming the security forces[27] → IA to ban free bearing of arms and build the capacity of its security forces in accordance with human rights laws
IA to **improve availability and quality of natural resources as a first response to emergencies**	• Provide material resources and establish capacity to meet massive demands	→ UN, Donors, and NGOs to lobby the IA to maintain and improve basic infrastructure to maximise local resources

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[27] UN Resolution 1546, Paragraph 17 to 21 – 8 June 2004 – Available at: http://www.uniraq.org/documents/Resolution1546.pdf

II. Attain active and efficient coordination amongst all actors to plan, update and improve operational response for ongoing and developing emergency situations, and include local communities and Iraqi aid workers as central actors in this process

Recommendations	Objectives	Operational steps
All actors to **improve coordination**	• Make more efficient and timely mechanisms that are in place • Achieve a common strategy between the various coordination bodies to meet the needs of the most vulnerable • Ensure participation of all levels of actors and adequate sharing of information and feedback	→ All to establish strong and coordinated local, regional and international response, lobbying and advocacy mechanisms and a coordination approach based upon mutual cooperation and respective knowledge → IA to: strengthen the capacity of local authorities and identify actors to update information on a daily basis about developing situations; increase central capacity, the accessibility of central authorities and institutionalise emergency response at the PM's level (ECRC); facilitate coordination with NGOs and IOs → UN to: take a stronger lead in humanitarian coordination and communication with all actors in terms of dispersal of humanitarian information; coordinate more effectively between its own Agencies; form a mechanism to draw on the vital knowledge of respected NNGOs and IOs in its decision making process → NGOs to lobby for the strengthening of coordination mechanisms within Donors and IA (national and local) and between different bodies → INGOs to coordinate with recognised NNGOs and, using tools and experience from other conflict zones, develop a trusted means of sharing information on reliable partners between NGOs and with relevant UN Agencies (for example through a Charter of willingness to share information or an MoU for sharing between a few trusted bodies) → All to increase efforts to address shortfalls in human resources and capacity in order to achieve these steps
UN Agencies, Donors, IA, IOs, INGOs to **recognise local communities and Iraqi aid workers as central actors in emergency response**	• Tailor operational response around local actors and needs • Increase efforts to address shortfalls in human resources at the local level	→ All to provide support to host communities → All to maximise local knowledge of the relevant interlocutors for efficiency and security purposes → INGOs, NNGOs and UN Agencies to build up a detailed picture of local material and human resources and knowledge → INGOs and UN Agencies to increase capacity building of NNGOs (accountability, assessments, monitoring, evaluation, funding

		applications, etc) and switch to a "remote support" strategy and transfer responsibilities to NNGO partners → NGOs and UN Agencies to lobby for NGO legislation that takes into account rights as well as obligations → NNGOs to identify other humanitarian actors working in similar fields and make use of local and international NGO networks → NNGOs to maximise their human resources by sharing a pool of Iraqi aid workers → NNGOs to communicate and share more with the relevant advocacy bodies information on humanitarian needs and their achievements in meeting these needs
IA, Donors, UN Agencies, NGOs to **update and improve operational responses**	• Update the Contingency Plan • Operationalise the Contingency Plan	→ UN to revise and refine the Contingency Plan according to current and developing situations, and involve all necessary partners in this process → UN and relevant operational and implementing partners to identify responsibilities, assessment tools and roles, resources available now and those required now and in case of massive needs, relevant contact information → NGOs to update or develop their own operational plans, taking into account the updated and refined Contingency Plan → IA to finalise humanitarian response strategies, according to HRL and IHL and develop national 'response' legislation accordingly

III. Create emergency funds that are accessible and flexible in order to prepare operational responses for emergency situations

Recommendations	Objectives	Operational steps
Donors, UN Agencies, IOs and NGOs to **enhance trust between field actors and funding bodies**	• Build transparency and accountability • Agree upon a common strategy • Develop a coherent field response based on needs that meet donors' expectations in terms of monitoring	→ Donors, intermediaries and humanitarian actors to come together to discuss and develop solutions and strategies around assessments, monitoring and evaluation
Donors, UN Agencies and IA to **provide adequate and appropriate funding for emergencies**	• Create flexible, neutral, readily available funds	→ All to plan now for the need for material resources and capacity to meet massive demands → UN Agencies, IOs and NGOs to lobby donors and funding bodies for flexible, neutral funds and ability to re-allocate funds already available to emergency needs → UN Agencies, IOs and NGOs to lobby for stronger coordination among donors and the establishment of common strategy within the IRFFI framework, and greater involvement within this framework → NGOs to establish a second channel of reliable and timely funding, other than the Trust Fund, linking with and being part of the ISRB process

IV. Recognise humanitarian organisations as appropriate, essential and neutral actors in meeting the needs of the most vulnerable and establish humanitarian corridors accordingly

Recommendations	Objectives	Operational steps
All actors to **recognise humanitarian organisations as appropriate, essential and neutral actors**	• Increase understanding, acceptance of and respect for the role of the humanitarian community in Iraq • Establish humanitarian operational and neutral space	→ UN Agencies, Donors, NGOs, IOs to lobby the IA for formal recognition of the use of humanitarian aid → UN Agencies, and NGOs to establish strong local, regional and international lobbying mechanisms for awareness and advocacy about the role of the humanitarian community, building on advocacy and awareness tools developed in other conflict zones, and maximising knowledge of local contacts and interlocutors → UN Agencies, NGOs and IOs to use these mechanisms to engage with actors who do not share the humanitarian agenda, such as MNF-I, other Belligerents, parts of the Media, and to increase trust between humanitarian actors and the local community → UN Agencies to train Iraqi security forces and the IA on humanitarian needs, aid and human rights, building on activities already underway by the UNAMI HR office
IA, All Belligerents (MNF-I, ISF, Militias, other Armed Groups) to **establish humanitarian corridors to facilitate access to vulnerable populations**	• Provide access for aid workers and convoys to those in need during conflict • Ensure that IHL and HRL will be respected	→ UN Agencies to *clarify* policy – for example, in terms of defining vulnerable groups - at national and local levels → UN Agencies, Donors, NGOs, IOs to ask Governments with forces present to organise a humanitarian corridor to ensure accessibility to humanitarian actors → UN Agencies, NGOs and IOs to negotiate with MNF-I and ISF in advance for the specific humanitarian access / routes required

List of acronyms used in report

CP	Contingency Plan
ECRC	Emergency Coordination and Response Cell
HRL	Human Rights Law
IA	Iraqi Authorities
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IP	Iraqi Police
IRFFI	International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq
IRCS	Iraqi Red Crescent Society
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces (Iraqi Army, national guards, MoI, counter-terrorism commandos)
ISRB	Iraqi Strategic Review Board
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
MMPW	(Iraqi) Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works
MNF- I	Multi-National Forces in Iraq (US-led armed forces)
MoA	(Iraqi) Ministry of Agriculture
MoD	(Iraqi) Ministry of Defense
MoDM	(Iraqi) Ministry of Displacement and Migration
MoED	(Iraqi) Ministry of Education
MoE	(Iraqi) Ministry of Electricity
MoF	(Iraqi) Ministry of Finance
MoHR	(Iraqi) Ministry of Human Rights
MoI	(Iraqi) Ministry of Interior
MoLSA	(Iraqi) Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
MoO	(Iraqi) Ministry of Oil
MoT	(Iraqi) Ministry of Trade
MoWR	(Iraqi) Ministry of Water Resources
MoYS	(Iraqi) Ministry of Youth and Sport
MPs	(Iraqi) Members of Parliament
MPDC	(Iraqi) Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation
NFIs	Non Food Items
NCCI	NGOs Coordination Committee in Iraq
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NMAA	National Mine Action Authority
NNGOs	National Non-Governmental Organisations
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PDS	Public Distribution System
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSCs	Private Security Companies
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
UN	United Nations
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VBIED	Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

1. What is your perception of the situation in Iraq now? (Politically, socially, economically, etc…)

2. How would you describe the violence occurring in Iraq?

3. Where would you say the conflict or emergency 'hotspots' are now? How has this pattern developed or changed over the past two years?

4. How do you think this situation will change in the near-to-medium future?

5. What is / will be the impact on the people of Iraq? In particular, what do / will possible emergency situations entail / be?

6. What is / will be the humanitarian impact and resultant needs? (Rescue, urgent, basic needs)

7. What is your modus operandi (operating methods, including base and place of intervention)? How are you adapting or building a response strategy to cope with these emergency situations and needs? What are your assessment, monitoring and contingency planning processes?

8. Do you have the necessary capacity to respond? (In terms of human resources, funding, information, goods, etc) Where are the shortfalls / gaps?

9. What (other) challenges do you face in responding to emergencies? What are the critical constraints (access, insecurity, etc…)?

10. In terms of dealing with these challenges and constraints, what has worked particularly well to date? How can we learn from and build on this? What has not worked that you thought would work?

11. What needs to change to make emergency response more effective? Who is responsible for which aspects of change?

12. How can the role of the UN be more effective in Iraq now and in the future?

Other comments

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[28] This General Question Briefing was adapted depending upon who was being interviewed, or to whom it was distributed, in order to glean the most relevant and detailed information.

APPENDIX 1b
Statistics of Meetings Held and Questionnaires Distributed

Wherever possible, the questionnaire was used as a basis for discussions during face to face meetings. The Table below summarises the meetings that were held:

Entities interviewed using questionnaire	
NGOs	16
UN Agencies	9
International Organisations	2
Donors	2
Iraqi Authorities	2
US Military	1
Research Institutes	1

In the cases where it was not possible to hold face to face meetings, questionnaires were sent with a request for the relevant persons to complete and return them by a certain date. The level of response is illustrated in the Table below:

Entities sent questionnaires to complete, in absence of face to face interviews					
Entities sent questionnaires	Number of questionnaires sent	Response			
		Yes		No	
Iraqi Authorities	9	0	0%	9	100%
UN (Iraq)	2	0	0%	2	100%
International Organisations	2	1	50%	1	50%
INGOs	5	2	40%	3	60%
NNGOs	3	2	66.3%	1	33.3%
Donors	1	1	100%	0	0%

APPENDIX 2
Desk Research Sources

NCCI
- NCCI NGO / NNGO Database
- Archives and Library
- NCCI Weekly Highlights
- NCCI Weekly Reading Selections
- NCCI Monthly Humanitarian Updates
- NCCI Round-ups
- Minutes of Meetings

United Nations
- Reports of the United Nations Secretary General
- UN Agency Documents (UNAMI, UNHCR, WHO, IOM, WFP, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNOPS, UNDP)
- Contingency Plans

Other International Organisations
- ICRC, IFRC, and their national organisations (i.e. IRCS)

Iraqi Authorities
- Government / Ministry Documents
- Minutes of Meetings

NGOs
- Research
- Surveys
- Reviews
- Analyses and Assessments
- Activity Reports and Updates
- Workshops, Training and Conferences
- Press Releases and Statements

Donors
- Strategies
- Reports
- Updates

Research Institutes
- Reports and Analyses
- Surveys

Media
- International
- Regional
- Local

ESTIMATES OF IRAQI CIVILIANS KILLED SINCE THE START OF THE WAR	
Source	**Estimate**
People's Kifah	37,000 up to October 2003[30]
Statement by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (as cited in Brookings)	>10,000 as of February, 2004
Iraq Living Conditions Survey (ILCS)	18,000 - 29,000 as of May 2004[31]
Sheik Omar Clinic, Baghdad (as cited in Brookings)	10,363 as of September 8, 2004 (in Baghdad and surrounding towns alone – see also Figure 1)
Amnesty International (London) (as cited in Brookings)	>10,000 as of September 8, 2004
The Human Rights Organization, Iraq (as cited in Brookings)	>30,000 as of September 8, 2004
The Lancet	About 100,000 or more as of September 2004[32]
Iraqiyun	128,000 as of July 2005[33]
Les Roberts (lead author of Lancet Report)	Up to 300,000 as of February 2006[34]
Iraq Index (assume *5,630-10,000* Iraqi civilians killed from March 19, 2003 – April 30, 2003 as reported in detail by Iraq Body Count) (as cited in Brookings)	Not including deaths from crime as of April 3, 2006: 18,961 – 33,334 Including deaths from crime as of April 3, 2006: 44,000 – 89,000
Iraq Body Count	34,511 – 38,660 as of 19 April 2006[35]

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[29] It should be noted that nobody knows exactly how many Iraqi civilians have been killed since the invasion in 2003. A number of sources are therefore given to take into account the range of estimates which exist. Where the reference 'Brookings' is given, examples are taken from the Brookings Institution 'Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,' 24 April 2006, available at www.brookings.edu/iraqindex.

[30] The People's Kifah organised hundreds of Iraqi academics and volunteers who conducted a survey in coordination "with grave-diggers across Iraq," and who also "obtained information from hospitals and spoke to thousands of witnesses who saw incidents in which Iraqi civilians were killed by U.S. fire." See http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/66E32EAF-0E4E-4765-9339-594C323A777F.htm.

[31] This was a survey of 21,668 households conducted by Iraq's Central Organisation for Statistics and Information Technology, the UNDP and Norway's Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies in April and May 2004. It suggests that in comparison with previous wars in the region, this war has lead to proportionately more deaths amongst women, children and the elderly. The designer of the survey stated that the number was certainly an underestimate. Over half the deaths reported in this survey were in southern Iraq, which suggests that it logged deaths caused by the initial invasion rather than the aftermath. Figures exclude criminal murder. See http://www.iq.undp.org/ILCS/overview.htm.

[32] "Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: cluster sample survey", published online, 29 October 2004, available at http://image.thelancet.com/extras/04art10342web.pdf. A cluster sample survey was undertaken throughout Iraq during September, 2004. 33 clusters of 30 households each were interviewed about household composition, births, and deaths since January, 2002. In those households reporting deaths, the date, cause, and circumstances of violent deaths were recorded. The relative risk of death associated with the 2003 invasion and occupation was assessed by comparing mortality in the months after the invasion with the period preceding it. Violence accounted for most of the excess deaths and air strikes from coalition forces accounted for most violent deaths. Violent deaths were widespread, reported in 15 of 33 clusters, and were mainly attributed to coalition forces. Most individuals reportedly killed by coalition forces were women and children. The risk of death from violence in the period after the invasion was 58 times higher than in the period before the war.

[33] An Iraqi humanitarian group headed by Dr. Hatim Al-Alwani and affiliated with the political party of Interim President Ghazi Al-Yawir. The group specified that the figure included only deaths confirmed by relatives, omitting the large numbers of people who have simply disappeared without trace. See http://washingtontimes.com/upi/20050712-090927-2280r.htm.

[34] See 'Do Iraqi Civilians Matter?' by Les Roberts, Alternet, posted 8 February 2006, available at http://www.alternet.org/story/31508/.

MULTIPLE FATALITY BOMBINGS (Brookings)
Total as of 23 April 2006:   687 (of which at least 290 were suicide bombings)

KILLED AND WOUNDED IN MULTIPLE FATALITY BOMBINGS (Brookings)[36]
Total as of 23 April 2006:   Killed: 6,116   Wounded: 12,167

Figure available at: http://www.alternet.org/story/31508/

Explanation of figure: The vertical axis gives the number of deaths; the horizontal axis the month in which the deaths were recorded. Before the war, about 10 percent of all Baghdad deaths were recorded in this morgue. (Data for December 2003 are missing.) While the use of morgues and the populations they serve can change over time and does not provide a true rate of death, the 2.7 fold increase of recorded deaths in the 18 months after the invasion is both dramatic and is almost all explained by the increase in gunshot and explosion-related wounds.[37]

AID WORKERS KILLED, INJURED, KIDNAPPED OR ARRESTED[38]	
Killed	c. 62 in total, of whom 24 were internationals
Injured	c. 200 in total including the Canal Hotel blast which injured c. 100-150 people c. 60 excluding Canal Hotel blast injuries, of which 42 were NGO staff, and 18 UN and IO staff; out of those killed, less than 10 were international staff
Kidnapped	c. 35 in total, including 17 international staff (2 international staff killed, 1 Iraqi still held)
Arrested	c. 24 in total, including 3 international staff

[35] The Iraq Body Count is "an ongoing human security project which maintains and updates the world's only independent and comprehensive public database of media-reported civilian deaths in Iraq that have resulted from the 2003 military intervention by the USA and its allies. The count includes civilian deaths caused by coalition military action and by military or paramilitary responses to the coalition presence (e.g. insurgent and terrorist attacks). It also includes excess civilian deaths caused by criminal action resulting from the breakdown in law and order which followed the coalition invasion." See http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/. However, it should be noted that the count is based upon Western media sources. Aside from the likelihood that press accounts are incomplete, this source does not record deaths that are the indirect result of the armed conflict.
[36] Any bombings that caused at least three fatalities are included as data.
[37] Figure and explanation taken from 'Do Iraqi Civilian Casualties Matter?', by Les Roberts, AlterNet, Posted on 8 February 2006, accessed on 17 April 2006 at http://www.alternet.org/story/31508/.
[38] These figures were provided by NCCI, which is currently compiling a database of incidents affecting aid workers in Iraq. It should be noted that all of these figures are absolute minimum numbers and some could in reality be significantly higher. It is also very difficult to differentiate numbers of national aid workers killed, injured, kidnapped, or arrested from general civilian data. 'c.' in the table stands for 'circa' – approximately.

IRAQIS KIDNAPPED (Brookings)[39]

January 2004:	2 per day in Baghdad
December 2004:	10 per day in Baghdad
December 2005:	Up to 30 per day nationwide
March 2006:	30-40 per day nationwide

FOREIGN NATIONALS KIDNAPPED IN IRAQ SINCE MAY 2003 (Brookings)

Total through 23 April 2006: 280
Of these: 46 killed, 142 released, 3 escaped, 6 rescued, 83 unknown

FOREIGN NATIONALS KIDNAPPED IN IRAQ SINCE MAY 2003 (Associated Press)[40]

Total through 30 March 2006: more than 250
Of these: at least 40 killed, 189 freed or escaped

IRAQI PRISON POPULATION (Brookings)

December 2005:	13,000 held by American troops plus an additional 12,000 held by Iraqi authorities;
January 2006:	14,000 in US custody
February 2006:	14,767 in US / Allied custody
March 2006:	15,000 in US / Allied custody

UN FIGURES AND FACTS ON THOSE CURRENTLY BEING DETAINED IN IRAQ[41]

- 14,222 held by coalition forces for 'urgent security reasons'
- 8,300 held by the justice ministry (which is the only Iraqi body that has the right to detain suspects for more than 72 hours)
- 6,000 held by the interior ministry
- 460 held by the defense ministry

TOTAL INTERNATIONAL TROOP STRENGTH IN IRAQ (Brookings)

March 2006: 153,000

NUMBER OF DAILY ATTACKS BY INSURGENTS (Brookings)

December 2003:	19
December 2004:	52
December 2005:	75[42]

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[39] The numbers given here may be lower than the actual number of kidnappings as the Iraqi Police suggests that kidnappings are widely under-reported. The Iraqi Interior Ministry estimates that 5,000 Iraqis were kidnapped nationwide between December 2003 and late April 2005.

[40] See 'A Look at Foreigners Taken Hostage in Iraq,' The Associated Press, 30 March 2006, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-5721463,00.html.

[41] See 'UN says thousands illegally detained in Iraq,' 21 April 2006, Geneva (ANTARA News), available at uruknet.info http://www.uruknet.info/?s1=1&p=22756&s2=22.

[42] A U.S. military report released on 23 January 2006 showed a 30 percent increase in insurgent attacks in 2005 compared to the previous year. "Iraq: Insurgent attacks rose in 2005 says, U.S. military report." UN Integrated Regional Information Network, 24 January 2006. Available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=51304&SelectRegion=Middle_East&SelectCountry=IRAQ.

Figures released by the **Iraq Body Count on 9 March 2006**, updated by statistics for the year 2005 from the main Baghdad morgue, show that the total number of civilians reported killed has risen year-on-year since 1 May 2003 (the date that President Bush announced "major combat operations have ended")[43]:

- 6,331 from 1st May 2003 to the first anniversary of the invasion, 19th March 2004 (324 days: Year 1)
- 11,312 from 20th March 2004 to 19th March 2005 (365 days: Year 2)
- 12,617 from 20th March 2005 to 1st March 2006 (346 days: Year 3)

In terms of average violent deaths per day this represents:

- 20 per day in Year 1
- 31 per day in Year 2 and
- 36 per day in Year 3

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[43] Source: Iraq Body Count Press Release 13, 9 March 2006, 'Iraq Death Toll in Third Year of Occupation is Highest Yet,' http://www.iraqbodycount.org/press/pr13.php. The IBC figure for Year 3 includes no deaths from March 2006, excludes the bulk of killings which followed the 22nd February bombing of a major Shia Muslim shrine in Samarra, and lacks Baghdad morgue data for January and February this year. If January and February 2006 are excluded as being clearly incomplete, then the daily death rate for the remaining part of Year 3 rises to 40 (11,480 deaths over 287 days = 40 per day). However even with incomplete data for the final months of Year 3, the number of civilians reported killed is already higher than for all of Year 2 (12,617 vs. 11,312).

APPENDIX 3b
Mapping of Violence

The majority of insurgent attacks are concentrated in 6 of Iraq's central governorates (Baghdad, Al Anbar, Salah al-Din, Ninewa, Diyala and Tameem), with a high number of incidents also occurring in the southern governorate of Basra.[44] Even though 80 percent of all attacks are directed towards Coalition Forces, 80 percent of all casualties are suffered by the Iraqi population.[45] Counter-insurgency operations are also focused in the Centre of Iraq.[46] More than 160 such operations have been undertaken to date.[47] This concentration of attacks and operations corresponds broadly to the percentage of attacks and total number of attacks recorded in Iraq's 18 provinces over different time periods during 2004 and 2005 (see Figures and Table in this section).

However, it is important to note that the patterns of violence are changing in Iraq. Whereas, as these figures generally indicate, for the first three years after the invasion, violence and 'hotspots' could largely be mapped according to insurgency and counter-insurgency operations – and was in a sense 'controlled' in terms of military operations, and where these were conducted - violence is now becoming *primarily sectarian* in character.[48] Militias are developing a rationale of their own, and this rationale is largely based on sectarian allegiances. This has critical implications when it comes to mapping violence as it broadens its potential and range: violence can now become widespread wherever there are mixed populations. Attacks and reprisal attacks can also be launched in areas where there is a predominance of one religious grouping and provoke reprisal attacks in other areas against different religious groups.

Patterns have been changing since late 2005 when political friction between Sunni and Shia populations rose even as U.S. troops began carrying out a long-term plan to decrease their street presence. Violence and killings accelerated particularly quickly in the aftermath of the bombing of the Shia Al-Askariya shrine in Samarra on 22 February 2006. General tensions are now extremely high. The events in Adhamiya, a Sunni northern district in Baghdad located in between two Shia areas, are a case in point. In April 2006, residents in this area took up arms to prevent the Iraqi security forces from the Interior ministry (alleged to have been accompanied by Shia militia) from entering the district. Local militias fought against each others' militias or security forces to protect 'their area', until a political solution was reached. The National Iraqi Guards reportedly concluded an agreement with the people of the quarter that guarantees that Ministry of Interior police commandos will be kept out of the district while attacks on army outposts will cease. The people of Adhamiya will

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[44] United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations; Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 'REBUILDING IRAQ Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges,' 25 April 2006, GAO-06-697T, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06697t.pdf, p11.

[45] Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq October 2005, Report to Congress In Accordance with Conference Report 109-72, Emergency Supplemental, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/20051013_publication_OSSRF.pdf.

[46] Counter-insurgency operations are primarily initiated by the MNF- I (counter-terrorism and military offensives are usually undertaken by the US Army), either alone, or alongside the ISF (consisting of national guards, units from the new Iraqi Army in addition to MOI commandos and counter-terrorism units).

[47] See 'Iraq 'Pacification' Operations,' http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_ongoing_mil_ops.htm, accessed 17 April 2006. N.B. The numbers of operations posted on this site are based on official figures given by the US – there are many more operations actually occurring.

[48] Certain insurgency operations have always been sectarian in character. However, the argument here is that, as a trend, sectarian violence is increasing.

protect their district.[49] Although this agreement appears to be holding, if such incidents increase, areas will be blocked and closed; access to vital supplies and the health care will become severely restricted and humanitarian needs will increase.

More than 1000 Iraqi civilians died violently in March, an increase from about 700 the previous month, according to military statistics. The US Government often cites the fact that little violence occurs in most of Iraq's 18 provinces.[50] However, those six or seven provinces where the majority of the killings and migrations take place are major population centres, generally mixed regions that include Baghdad, and contain much of the country's infrastructure - crucial factors in Iraq's prospects for stability.

A snapshot of recent sectarian violence[51]

- 24 April: 25 Iraqis killed; 10 in a coordinated set of 7 car bombs in Baghdad that also wounded 80; Iraqi police discovered 32 bodies of recent recruits to the security forces at two sites in Baghdad and another in Mosul.
- 23 April: 27 Iraqis killed; car bomb aimed at a police patrol in Baghdad killed 3 and wounded at least 25 near the Ministry of Health; 4 killed in Mosul; 22 bodies killed execution-style discovered in Adhamiyah and Sink neighbourhoods of Baghdad, and in Fallujah.
- 22 April: 26 Iraqis killed; a mortar shell landed near the Ministry of Defense in Baghdad, killing 5.
- 21 April: 17 Iraqis killed, with major bombings in Mosul and Baghdad; 28 policemen killed or wounded.
- 19 April: 19 Iraqis killed; some reports say that among the victims were two school teachers in a Shia district, who had their throats slit in front of their students.
- 17 April: 26 Iraqis killed during clashes in Adhamiyah and Ramadi and other violence around the country; 17 bodies discovered in Baghdad.
- 15 April: 9 Iraqis killed; two car bombs explode in Baghdad, one targeting police in a Shia area.
- 14 April: Bombs in two Sunni mosques in Baqubah kill 4 and wound 8.
- 13 April: At least 13 killed as car bomb explodes in a market in a mainly Shia district of northern Baghdad.
- 12 April: 25 Iraqis killed in bombing of busy market area near a Shia mosque in the town of Howaider, near Baghdad.
- 7 April: More than 90 Iraqis killed in triple suicide attack on Shia mosque in Baghdad.
- 2 April: US military says 1,313 Iraqi civilians died in sectarian violence in March.
- Discovery of victims of execution-style killings almost daily.

The increase in sectarian violence is spurring tens of thousands of Iraqis to flee from mixed Shia-Sunni areas and the rate at which displacement is occurring is increasing.[52] Figures from the Ministry for Displacement and Migration show a doubling in the first two weeks of April 2006 of the number of Iraqis forced to move. Reports of people leaving their homes because of violence or intimidation, or simply

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[49] See 'Street Battles in Adhamiya,' Zeyad, Healing Iraq, 20 April 2006, available at http://healingiraq.blogspot.com/archives/2006_04_01_healingiraq_archive.html#114548394546127456; Azzaman Newspaper, 'قصف وزارتي الدفاع والداخلية ببغداد - العثور علي 22 جثة ف الأعظمي والفلوجة ومقتل 3 جنود أمريكيين', Issue 2382, 24 April 2006 (Arabic), available at http://www.azzaman.com/azzaman/http/display.asp?fname=/azzaman/articles/2006/04/02-23/999.htm.
[50] Iraqis flee mixed areas as civilian killings rise, Edward Wong and Kirk Semple, The New York Times, 3 April 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/02/news/outlook.php.
[51] Examples have been taken from 'Informed Comment - Thoughts on the Middle East, History, and Religion,' Juan Cole, available at http://www.juancole.com/, and also BBC news reports available at www.bbcnews.com. These examples are not intended to give a fully comprehensive overview of *all* incidents on the days in question, but just some reported examples.
[52] Iraqis flee mixed areas as civilian killings rise, Edward Wong and Kirk Semple, The New York Times, 3 April 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/02/news/outlook.php.

because they no longer feel safe, are becoming more and more common.[53] Since 22 February 2006 IOM estimates that 6959 families, (41754 individuals) have been displaced. From 22 February until 12 April 2006, the MoDM estimates that 13764 families, (82584 individuals) have been displaced.[54] Much of this displacement is taking place in and around Baghdad where the violence has been worst, with many people moving in with relatives or friends. However, there are also significant movements elsewhere. Hundreds of Sunnis from the overwhelmingly Shia south, have been heading north - many going to Sunni areas in and around Fallujah, west of Baghdad.[55]

Three further areas of tension should be noted. Long-simmering political disputes and power struggles between the Mahdi Army, led by cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, and the Badr Organization, the armed wing of Iraq's largest Shia political party (SCIRI) have manifested themselves in violence, particularly in the southern cities of Najaf, Basra, Nasiriyah, Karbala, Samawah, Diwaniyah and Amarah, as well as in neighbourhoods of Baghdad, and Baqubah, a mixed Sunni-Shia town north of Baghdad.[56] These two militia groups have also begun to establish themselves in another potential hotspot area – oil-rich Kirkuk – Iraq's third largest city and in effect the financial key to Kurdish independence.

According to recent reports, hundreds of Shia militiamen have deployed to Kirkuk vowing to fight any attempt to shift control over Kirkuk to the Kurdish-governed north. Kirkuk is widely considered the most likely flash-point for an Iraqi civil war. Inter-ethnic tension between Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen continue to be fuelled by Kurdish aspirations for the city to be incorporated in to a Federal Kurdish autonomous region, also extending into Iran and Turkey. This is vehemently opposed by the Turkmen and Arab populations of the city and reflected in a significant increase in the number of hostile incidents within Kirkuk. During the rule of President Saddam Hussein, Arabs brought in from elsewhere in Iraq displaced thousands of Kurds. According to US estimates, since the 2003 invasion, as many as 300,000 Kurds have returned to the area, making them its largest ethnic community. Kurds also occupy most of the top provincial political and security jobs. Iraq's constitution calls for a referendum on the future of the region by the end of 2007, but many key details are in dispute, such as who will be permitted to vote.[57]

Finally, and very much connected to the issue of Kirkuk, are the regional tensions that concern the fate of Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey has repeatedly announced that it is committed to the protection of the large Turkmen minority in Kirkuk and has threatened to intervene militarily if Kirkuk should be annexed to Iraqi Kurdistan or if Iraqi Kurdistan should declare independence. According to recent reports, Turkey

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[53] Iraq unrest forces 65,000 to flee, by Andrew North, BBC News, Baghdad, 13 April 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4905770.stm.
[54] See International Organization for Migration, 'Displacement Due to Recent Violence', Iraq, 19 April 2006, IOM Iraq IDP Program, for both sets of figures. Available at http://www.ncciraq.org/article.php3?id_article=616 .
[55] Iraq unrest forces 65,000 to flee, by Andrew North, BBC News, Baghdad, 13 April 2006.
[56] See, for example, 'Political Violence Surges in Iraq, Two-Day Toll Reaches 100; Third Charter Deadline Missed,' Ellen Knickmeyer and Anthony Shadid, Washington Post, 26 August 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/25/AR2005082500294_pf.html; 'Shiite power struggle simmers in Najaf - In Iraq's Shiite heartland, tensions remain high between Moqtada al Sadr and Iraq's ruling party SCIRI,' Jill Carroll, The Christian Science Monitor, 2 November 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1102/p07s01-woiq.html.
[57] 'Shiite Militias Move Into Oil-Rich Kirkuk, Even as Kurds Dig In - Control of Iraqi City Has Long Been in Dispute,' Jonathan Finer, Washington Post, 25 April 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/24/AR2006042401560.html?sub=AR; 'Iraq: Allaying Turkey's Fears Over Kurdish Ambitions,' Middle East Report N°35, 26 January 2005, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3241.

has increased its troop presence in Kurdish dominated Southeastern Turkey by 40,000—bringing the total number of troops to 290,000. Turkish concerns about an independent Kurdistan have been echoed by Iran and Syria. All three countries have Kurdish minorities with varying degrees of separatist aspirations.[58]

Total Attacks by Province: 29 August 2005 – 16 September 2005[59]


Figure available at: www.brookings.edu/iraqindex

[58] See, for example, 'Kirkuk: Between Kurdish Separatism and Iraqi Federalism,' Nimrod Raphaeli, Middle East Media Research Institute, 31 March 2005, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/election/2005/0331kirkuk.htm; 'Strike Iran, Watch Pakistan and Turkey Fall - What are the consequences of such an action?', John Stanton, 22 April 2006, available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=STA20060422&articleId=2319; 'Turkey and Iraq: The Perils (and Prospects) of Proximity,' Henri J. Barkey, United States Institute for Peace, July 2005, Special Report No. 141, available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr141.html.
[59] Table taken from the Brookings Institution 'Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,' 24 April 2006, available at www.brookings.edu/iraqindex. Source given in report: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq October 2005, Report to Congress In Accordance with Conference Report 109-72, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005, page 21, information from MNC-1.

POLICE AND CIVILIAN DEATHS BY REGION[60]		
Region	**Police Deaths**	**Civilian Deaths**
Baghdad	527	20,125
Anbar	185	2,363
Basra	40	1,640
Babil	136	1,399
Nineveh	166	1,355
Diyala	276	1,217
Salah ad Din	172	1,193
Karbala	21	982
Dhiqar	8	974
Najaf	26	749
Tamim	126	716
Wasit	12	433
Irbil	60	140
Muthanna	2	121
Sulaimaniya	4	85
Qadisiya	1	68
Misan	10	31
Dahuk	1	3
Unknown Location	141	67
TOTAL	**1,914**	**33,661**

Crude mortality per 1000 people per year, by Governorate, before and after the invasion[61] Figure available at: http://image.thelancet.com/extras/04art10342web.pdf.

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[60] Table taken from the Brookings Institution 'Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,' 24 April 2006, available at www.brookings.edu/iraqindex. This chart includes deaths from the start of the war until January 1, 2006, as reported by Iraq Body Count, cited in "Iraq Body Count: War Dead Figures," *BBC News Online*, March 20, 2006.
[61] Bar graphs represent number of deaths per 1000 person-years. Governorate rates are on a scale of 15 deaths per 1000 person-years, except for Anbar governorate, where deaths were more than ten times higher. This map appeared in The Lancet Study: 'Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: cluster sample survey', 29 October 2004, http://image.thelancet.com/extras/04art10342web.pdf, (© Oxford Cartographers 2004).

APPENDIX 4
Workshop Statistics and References

Workshop Statistics: 28 – 30 March 2006

	Invited	Attended	%
Total Number of Organisations Invited	90		
Number of Organisations that Attended	40		
	Invited	**Attended**	**%**
INGO	32	18	56.25%
NNGO	10	6	60.00%
ICRC, IRCS, IFRC	3	2	66.67%
UN	9	7	77.78%
Donor	19	5	26.32%
Authorities	10	1	10.00%
CMOC	2	1	50.00%
Other	5	0	0.00%
Total	**90**	**40**	**44.44%**

Workshop References

- The second day, the attendance was divided in 3 working group called "modus operandi", "actors and stakeholders" and "means". The **outcomes of the 3 working groups** are available at: http://www.ncciraq.org/article.php3?id_article=673

- The **detailed recommendations are** also available **in Arabic** at:
http://www.ncciraq.org/article.php3?id_article=674